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Executive summary 
• ASEAN is the most prominent regional cooperation group in East Asia. Australia has had a 
multilateral relationship with ASEAN since 1974 and now pursues many areas of cooperation with 
the Association. This paper surveys ASEAN’s evolution and recent development and Australia’s 
relations with it. 
• ASEAN was formed in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand 
(Brunei joined in 1984). ASEAN’s cooperation style stressed respect for national sovereignty, 
avoiding confrontation, reaching agreement through consensus and proceeding at a pace all 
members were comfortable with. ASEAN after 1995 accepted four new members (Vietnam, Laos, 
Myanmar and Cambodia) which bolstered its claim to represent Southeast Asia, but increased the 
diversity within the Association and made some areas of cooperation harder to pursue.  
• The paper outlines ASEAN’s major phases of development since 1967. Since the late 1990s, 
ASEAN has pursued cooperation in three major ways:  
• Firstly, ASEAN in 2003 adopted a commitment to develop an ‘ASEAN Community’ among its 
own members. This involves ‘three pillars’: the ASEAN Economic Community; the ASEAN 
Political-Security Community; and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. ASEAN has also 
developed its own institutional Charter (in 2008) and has sought to widen its cooperation, 
including in the area of human rights standards. The paper outlines these initiatives and 
ASEAN’s challenges in pursuing them.  
• ASEAN, secondly, has continued to engage the major powers in political and economic 
dialogue to enhance the overall security and prosperity of Southeast Asia, placing special 
emphasis on the ‘big three’ Asia-Pacific powers, the United States, China and Japan.  
• ASEAN, thirdly, is sponsoring wider regional cooperation by playing a leading role in the 
initiation and development of additional multilateral groupings. These include principally the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (intended to build confidence and enhance dialogue on security 
issues), the ASEAN Plus Three grouping of the ASEAN ten, China, Japan and South Korea 
(whose activities have stressed financial cooperation) and the East Asia Summit, a leadership 
dialogue bringing together ASEAN with the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, India, 
Russia, New Zealand and Australia. ASEAN has also recently inaugurated a meeting of defence 
minsters (the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus Eight) and the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership, to promote further trade liberalisation and market integration. The 
paper reviews recent developments in each group and ASEAN’s continuing efforts to sponsor 
cooperation in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific when relations among the major powers are 
often marked by tensions and mistrust. 
• ASEAN, the paper suggests, has established a substantial profile but faces challenges in 
maintaining its cohesion and influence. The paper discusses four significant current issues for 
ASEAN. In the South China Sea, the complex pattern of claims and disputes, which involve four 
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ASEAN members as claimants (Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam) along with China 
and Taiwan, has brought increased tensions since 2009 and placed pressure on ASEAN’s capacity 
to facilitate constructive dialogue and seek ways of alleviating tensions. In Myanmar the striking 
process of change since 2010 has seen substantial progress in political and economic 
liberalisation and reform along with some serious ongoing problems, including inter-ethnic 
conflict. ASEAN has a major stake in the pattern of change in Myanmar, particularly as the 
country is due to assume the high-profile role of Chair of ASEAN for the year 2014. ASEAN’s 
ambitious programs of cooperation are highlighting the pressures facing the ASEAN Secretariat 
and an expansion of funding and resources is likely to be needed. ASEAN is also considering 
whether to consider accepting any further members, particularly in the case of Timor-Leste. 
• Since 1974, Australia has benefited from ASEAN’s contribution to maintaining inter-state stability 
in its region. Relations have expanded substantially in the past decade and can benefit further 
from ASEAN’s integration programs, to which Australia is closely linked through the ASEAN-
Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement inaugurated in 2009. ASEAN is also a key part of 
the ‘regional architecture’ which the Australian Government wishes to see enhanced. The paper 
reviews recent developments in relations since 2008 and highlights Australia’s important ongoing 
stake in ASEAN’s progress in building its own community and in contributing to wider regional 
cooperation. 
Introduction 
The Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN) is the premier regional grouping in East Asia. It is 
widely credited for its substantial contribution to making Southeast Asia more stable and more 
prosperous than might otherwise have been the case. ASEAN has also played a major role as sponsor 
of wider regional cooperation groupings which provide forums for the Southeast Asian states, the 
major powers and other interested countries (including Australia) to discuss and coordinate 
approaches to regional issues. 
After a cautious beginning in 1967, ASEAN has attained a high international profile. However, 
pursuing cooperation among its very diverse members has never been an easy task. In the past 
decade it has struggled with the challenges of trying to both deepen cooperation and maintain unity, 
when its members remain highly sensitive about their own rights to national sovereignty. ASEAN’s 
desired image of congenial discussion and capacity for peaceful change has recently been dented by 
incidences of conflict between members, including a border dispute between Thailand and 
Cambodia and (in 2013) the re-emergence of discord (involving the Philippines and Malaysia) over 
the status of the Malaysian state of Sabah. ASEAN is also experiencing pressure in relation to the 
competing territorial claims in the South China Sea which involve four ASEAN members along with 
China and also the government in Taiwan. Tensions over South China Sea issues saw the ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers unable to issue an agreed communique after their meeting in Phnom Penh in July 
2012, for the first time in forty-five years. ASEAN’s ongoing success thus cannot be taken for 
granted. 
 
2 
ASEAN and regional cooperation: recent developments and Australia’s interests 
ASEAN is a significant partner for Australia. Australia has had a multilateral relationship with ASEAN 
since 1974 and will mark the 40th anniversary of this next year. Since the 1970s, Australia-ASEAN 
cooperation has involved both efforts to enhance regional security, for example through the 
Cambodia peace process (1991–1993) and through development of the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(from 1994) and the East Asia Summit (from 2005), and regional economic cooperation (including 
the multilateral ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement adopted in 2009). 
This paper seeks to provide a concise survey of ASEAN’s recent progress and major policy emphases 
and challenges. Section I outlines ASEAN’s inauguration and development and the Association’s 
efforts to deepen its own cooperation by pursuing development of the ASEAN Economic 
Community, the ASEAN Political-Security Community and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. 
Section II discusses ASEAN’s efforts to develop wider cooperation in East Asia, in the context of the 
often tense and competitive relations among the major powers, particularly through the ASEAN 
Regional Forum, the ASEAN Plus Three process and the East Asia Summit. The paper in Section III 
considers recent challenges confronting ASEAN in pursuing cooperation and maintaining cohesion, 
including contested interests in the South China Sea, the political transition in Myanmar, ASEAN’s 
institutional capacities and the issue of potential membership for Timor-Leste. The paper concludes 
in Section IV with an assessment of Australia’s current major policy interests in relations with ASEAN, 
including in economic relations, political interactions, and cooperation in the development of wider 
regional dialogues.  
I: ASEAN since 1967 
A central characteristic of cooperation efforts in East Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific regions is that 
they have involved multiple groupings and forums rather than a set of overarching and inclusive 
institutions, such as those developed in Europe by the European Union.1 This institutional diversity 
has emerged partly because of the great variety among the regional states, which vary from Japan to 
Laos. The diversity has also stemmed from the fact that sensitivities and competition in relations 
among the major powers (especially the US, China and Japan) have impeded development of the 
common ground and trust necessary for a regional group with comprehensive membership to be 
able to emerge and operate effectively. As a result, a number of groups and forums with differing 
and sometimes overlapping memberships have emerged and have operated simultaneously.  
1.  ‘Regions’ in international politics are often not geographically defined but socially-constructed entities, and 
appropriate definitions of them are frequently contested. For the purposes of this paper, the term ‘East Asia’ refers 
to the states of Southeast Asia along with China, Japan, and the two Korean states. The term ‘Asia-Pacific’ commonly 
refers to the ‘East Asian’ states just mentioned, along with other interested countries including Russia, the United 
States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Pacific islands and some states in Latin America which have declared 
significant identities in this wider region. In this paper, unless otherwise stated, ‘Asia-Pacific’ will refer to the member 
countries of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation group (APEC) (see next footnote). For comparative analyses of 
East Asia and Asia-Pacific cooperation groupings see William A Tow, Tangled Webs: Security Architectures in Asia, 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, July 2008 and Giovanni Capannelli and See Seng Tan, ‘Institutions for 
Asian integration: innovation and reform’, ADBI Working Paper Series, no. 345, August 2012, accessed 15 July 2013,  
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ASEAN is an association of Southeast Asian states which has operated alongside other groups, both 
inter-governmental and non-official or semi-official. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
grouping is an association of economies inaugurated in 1989 which has 21 members in East Asia, 
North America and Latin America.2 APEC was founded with a commitment to trade and investment 
liberalisation and facilitation but since 1993 its scope has widened to include an annual leaders 
meeting and its discussions have extended to include political and security issues. Other inter-
governmental groups have included the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (established in 2001 by 
China, Russia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) which has interests 
focussing on East and Central Asia, and the Six Party Talks process (South and North Korea, the US, 
China, Japan and Russia) which emerged to try to alleviate and resolve tensions on the Korean 
peninsula.3 A further inter-governmental grouping is the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), which was 
inaugurated in 1996 as a dialogue between Asian and European states, and is convened every two 
years.4 
Dialogues have also been pursued on a non-official or semi-official basis. In the broad Asia-Pacific 
context, discussions have been sponsored by the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC, a forum for 
business leaders across the Pacific since 1967) and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) 
which since 1980 has been a tripartite dialogue among business, government and academic figures 
to advance cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.5 Another notable example of a forum initiated by a non-
governmental body is the ‘Shangri-La Dialogue’ on regional security issues, which has been 
sponsored by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies and has since 2000 
brought together defence ministers and senior officials for discussions annually in Singapore.6 
In this pluralist environment, ASEAN has been and continues to be a leading contributor to 
cooperation efforts, both among its own members and with a wide range of partners. 
2. APEC’s members are: Australia; Brunei Darussalam; Canada; Chile; China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; Korea; 
Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Papua New Guinea; Peru; The Philippines; Russia; Singapore; Chinese Taipei; 
Thailand; USA and Vietnam.  
3. See the SCO website here; on the Six Party Talks see Scott Snyder, ‘Six Party Talks: “Action for action” and the 
formalization of regional security cooperation in Northeast Asia’, International Journal for Korean Unification Studies, 
vol. 16 (1), 2007, pp. 1–24. 
4.  Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Asia-Europe Meeting’, accessed 8 July 2013. For a recent assessment of 
ASEM see Julie Gilson, ‘The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)’, in Mark Beeson and Richard Stubbs, eds, Routledge 
handbook of Asian regionalism, Routledge, London, 2012, pp. 394-405. Australia joined the ASEM process in 2010; 
see Melissa Conley-Tyler and Eric Lerais, ‘Australia and ASEM: the first two years’, Working paper series 2013/1, 
Monash University European and EU Centre, May 2013, accessed 1 October 2013.  
5.  On PBEC see here and for PECC see here.  
6.  For details of the 2013 Dialogue (29 May–2 June) see International Institute of Strategic Studies, ‘Shangri-La Dialogue 
2013’, accessed 12 July 2013. 
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Southeast Asia and the ‘ASEAN Way’  
Southeast Asia is not necessarily a favourable environment for regional cooperation.7 The socio-
economic makeup and political history of its states are extremely diverse. This diversity was 
compounded by colonial intervention (everywhere except Thailand)—which drew territories and 
peoples towards six different external powers (Britain, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal and 
the US). This meant that up to the 1950s the peoples and elites of the existing and emerging states 
had had very little interaction or familiarity with each other.  
After World War Two, and an attempt by Japan to impose its own form of colonial domination, the 
Western colonial powers departed—peacefully, or after violent anti-colonial struggles. But the new 
states were very open to the influence of external powers, which could well intervene in internal 
and/or interstate conflicts, as occurred in the three states of Indochina after 1959–60.  
As the region entered the 1960s, there were substantial additional inter-state conflicts among a 
number of Southeast Asian countries, fuelled by post-colonial tensions. Indonesia after 1963 
opposed the formation of the new federation of Malaysia. The Philippines had a territorial claim to 
the Malaysian state of Sabah. After two years of uneasy membership, Singapore was ejected from 
the new Malaysian federation in 1965. All this was happening before any notion of an ‘East Asian 
economic miracle’. Southeast Asia’s states were predominantly poor, dependent heavily on resource 
exports and anxious that domestic Communist movements could exploit these difficult economic 
circumstances.  
This was the environment when five countries—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand—formed ASEAN in Bangkok on 8 August 1967. Their central purpose was to try to stabilise 
relations among themselves, and thus to encourage an improved environment for economic growth 
and ward off the dangers of external interference and disruption.  
The ASEAN approach to regional cooperation after 1967 involved several key features: 
• A steady process of contact and confidence–building to prevent conflict among the members. In 
a style known widely as ‘the ASEAN Way’, the Association emphasised informality and loose 
arrangements, personal relations rather than ambitious institution-building, and the sovereign 
equality of members. ASEAN generally avoided the exercise of overt leadership, and sought 
gradual change based on consensus with cooperation proceeding ‘at a pace comfortable to all’. 
• The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member countries (from outside or 
within the region) was central to ‘the ASEAN Way’. ASEAN enshrined this ‘norm’ in the Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation (TAC), signed in Bali in 1976. The Treaty has been a key ASEAN ‘norm-
7.  The early parts of this paper draw from Frank Frost, ASEAN’s regional and multilateral relations: recent developments 
and Australia’s interests, Research paper, 12, 2008–09, Parliamentary Library, 9 October 2008, accessed 29 July 2013.  
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setting’ document—which ASEAN has invited other states to accede to and endorse both within 
and outside the region (22 non-ASEAN parties have done this).8 These norms are: 
Respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national 
identity of all nations; 
freedom from external interference, subversion or coercion; 
non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; 
the peaceful settlement of disputes; 
renunciation of the threat or use of force; and 
effective cooperation among the ASEAN members themselves. 
ASEAN has sought to pursue these norms in several ways. It declared in 1971 that Southeast Asia 
should be ‘a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality’ (ZOPFAN), free from the interference of 
external powers. In 1997 ASEAN added to its norms of cooperation by adopting the Southeast 
Asia Nuclear-Weapons Free Zone Treaty by which members reassure each other that they will not 
acquire, station, transport or test nuclear weapons.9  
• ASEAN developed a distinctive style of organisation which emphasised frequent meetings and 
discouraged ‘top heavy’ institutions. ASEAN’s key structure was the annual Ministerial Meetings, 
initially of foreign ministers but from 1976 including economics ministers. ASEAN held its first 
summit of heads of government in 1976.  From 1997 they were held annually and there are now 
two each year; they are a central focus for ASEAN’s cooperation.  
• ASEAN has a Secretary-General and has had a comparatively small Secretariat (with a huge 
workload—now organising more than 1000 meetings each year). The Secretariat’s role and 
capacities, however, are under ongoing discussion (see Section III below). 
• ASEAN has sought active dialogue with the major external powers. This process begun in 1976 at 
the Bali summit and is now a central feature of ASEAN. It has been pursued since 1979 at the 
Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) attended by the foreign ministers of ASEAN’s ‘dialogue 
partners’ (now ten in number).10 
ASEAN has developed in four main phases since 1967. 
8.  The non-ASEAN parties to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation are Papua New Guinea, China, India, Japan, 
Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Russia, New Zealand, Mongolia, Australia, France, East Timor, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, United States, Canada, Turkey, European Union, United Kingdom, Brazil and 
Norway.  
9.  Christopher B. Roberts, ASEAN regionalism: cooperation, values and institutionalization, Routledge, London, 2012, 
p. 59. 
10.  ASEAN’s dialogue partners are Australia, Canada, China, European Union, India, Japan, South Korea (the Republic of 
Korea), New Zealand, Russia, and the United States of America: the United Nations Development Program also has 
dialogue status.  For concise summaries of ASEAN’s external relations with dialogue partners see ‘External relations’, 
ASEAN Secretariat, accessed 27 June 2013. 
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From 1967–1975 ASEAN had a cautious beginning; activities were very low key and the emphasis 
was on communication and confidence–building. This was not surprising, given that four out of the 
five members had just recently experienced substantial tensions and conflicts. 
1976–1991: ASEAN’s first major turning point came in 1975, with the end of the non-Communist 
regimes in South Vietnam and Cambodia in April (and later that year in Laos). There was major 
uncertainty in the region about the dangers of further instability—and concerns about the United 
States’ likely future commitment to regional security after its withdrawal from Vietnam. ASEAN took 
the initiative by holding its first meeting of heads of government at Bali in February 1976:  it unveiled 
the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, upgraded political and economic cooperation, and began 
formal dialogues with external partners including the US, Japan and Australia.  
ASEAN was a product of the Cold War period in Southeast Asia and it gained major influence through 
its role in two Cold War-era regional crises: refugee flows from Indochina after 1975, and the 
Cambodia conflict after 1978. ASEAN played a major role in developing responses to the transit of 
the three million people who left Indochina by land and sea, particularly from mid-1978. It 
coordinated with the UN in providing refuge and obtaining aid, and helped to gain resettlement 
commitments from Western countries, including Australia. ASEAN’s joint action played a major role 
in alleviating this crisis. 
Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 (with backing from the Soviet Union with whom 
Vietnam had signed a treaty of friendship in November 1978) ousted the Khmer Rouge regime but 
alarmed the ASEAN members, who rejected Vietnam’s invasion as a violation of the principle of 
territorial sovereignty. ASEAN acted to deny legitimacy to Vietnam’s actions, particularly through 
sponsoring annual resolutions on Cambodia in the UN General Assembly. ASEAN members also 
cooperated with the major powers, particularly China and the United States, to oppose Vietnam’s 
policies. ASEAN then played a central role in the efforts developed in the late 1980s (with a 
substantial input from Australia) to develop a peace agreement, which led to the 1991 Paris 
Agreements and UN intervention. The 1980s were a high point for ASEAN as a ‘diplomatic 
community’, when it adopted and pursued a joint position on a major international relations issue.  
1991–2003: The decline of Cold War confrontation internationally was reflected directly in Southeast 
Asia by the end of the Soviet Union (and of the Vietnam-Soviet special relationship), Vietnam’s 
withdrawal from Cambodia (in September 1989), and by the resolution of the Cambodia conflict as a 
regional and international problem. The Cambodia agreement also created new chances for detente 
between former adversaries, particularly China and Vietnam, and Vietnam and the ASEAN states. 
But ASEAN also faced an international climate where many problems competed for the attention of 
the major powers. With the Cambodia issue resolved, there were concerns that ASEAN might not be 
able to hold the international attention to which its members had become accustomed during the 
1980s.  
ASEAN therefore moved to take the initiative, in several ways. Firstly, ASEAN took the opportunity to 
extend its coverage in Southeast Asia by inviting previously estranged neighbouring countries to 
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become members (Brunei had already joined in 1984). Vietnam was accepted as a member in 1995, 
Myanmar (Burma) and Laos in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.11  
Secondly, ASEAN sought to intensify economic cooperation. In the 1970s and 1980s, key ASEAN 
economies had been among the leaders in East Asia pursuing export-oriented growth fuelled by 
foreign investment. ASEAN countries now faced new competition, especially from China, for markets 
and for foreign investment. ASEAN therefore sought to bring their separate economies closer 
together and gain greater economies of scale by pursuing development of an ASEAN Free Trade 
Area, announced in 1992. ASEAN was also influenced strongly by the traumatic impact of the Asian 
Financial Crisis from mid-1997, which affected adversely a number of members’ economies and 
damaged the ASEAN’s region’s image of economic growth and progress. However, it also 
encouraged renewed efforts to enhance ASEAN’s scope and capacities in cooperation.12 
Thirdly, ASEAN moved to extend its own model of cooperation more widely in the East Asia and Asia-
Pacific regions, by sponsoring new multilateral dialogues (see discussion below).  
ASEAN’s latest and current phase of development began in 2003.  ASEAN members realised that if 
the Association was to retain credibility and momentum, it needed to deepen its economic and 
political cooperation. For example, ASEAN countries were competing with China for Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), but they were doing so as ten separate economies with many different sets of 
rules in economic activity.  
In October 2003, at a second landmark conference in Bali (known accordingly as ‘Bali II’), ASEAN 
therefore committed itself to developing an ‘ASEAN Community’. The members endorsed the 
‘Declaration of ASEAN Concord II’ which stated that, ‘For the sustainability of our region’s economic 
development we affirmed the need for a secure political environment based on a strong foundation 
of mutual interests generated by economic cooperation’. To pursue ASEAN’s goals, the members 
declared: 
An ASEAN Community shall be established comprising three pillars, namely political and security 
cooperation, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural cooperation that are closely intertwined 
and mutually reinforcing for the purpose of ensuring durable peace, stability and shared 
prosperity in the region.13 
The ASEAN Bali Concord II declaration also reaffirmed ASEAN’s commitment to enhance ‘economic 
linkages with the world economy’, foster ASEAN competitiveness and a favourable investment 
environment, and advance adherence to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as a functioning and 
11.  Burma was referred to by that name until 1989, when the military regime changed the English translations of many 
names, after which the term ‘Myanmar’ was introduced. Many opposition groups, including ethnic communities, 
continued to refer to the country as ‘Burma’.  After 1989, the Australian Government generally continued to use the 
name ‘Burma’, except in cases of formal international dialogue, for example in the UN or with ASEAN. In mid-2012, in 
the context of the reform process in the country since 2010, the Government adopted general usage of the name 
‘Myanmar’. 
12.  Roberts, op. cit., ASEAN regionalism: cooperation, values and institutionalization, pp. 88–101. 
13.  ‘Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) Bali, 7 October 2003’, accessed 11 May 2013. 
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effective code of conduct for the region.14 The target date set for achieving an ASEAN Community 
was initially the year 2020, but this was later brought forward to 2015. ASEAN has since made some 
significant efforts to try to follow up these commitments. 
Pursuing an ‘ASEAN Community’ 
ASEAN’s cooperation strategy has two key elements. Firstly, ASEAN is seeking to deepen accord 
among its own members through development of an ‘ASEAN Community’ with three inter-related 
components: economic, political-security and socio-cultural. Secondly, ASEAN is striving to 
consolidate its position at the centre of cooperation in East Asia overall.  
The ASEAN Economic Community  
The desirability of deeper economic integration among the ASEAN members has been reaffirmed in 
a recent report by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), issued at the end of 2012. A major pressure 
for greater cooperation has been the rapid development of the economies of the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) and India. The ADB report noted: 
[The] PRC’s economic phenomenon and India’s liberalisation proved that ‘size matters’. ASEAN 
needed its combined market to compete. Without further integration, the region would be left 
behind. ASEAN needed to tap its vast competitive and diverse labor pool and potential consumer 
base. It also held the unique position of maintaining relatively good relations with both regional 
giants, while being a threat to neither. ASEAN was a key supplier to the PRC-centred ‘Factory 
Asia’, including Japanese multinationals and those from the Republic of Korea, while a good 
emissary for India’s ‘Look East’ policy.15  
The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) aims to advance the market integration already being 
pursued by the private sector by creating a ‘seamless production base’ and an integrated market 
among the members. ASEAN’s goals include the elimination of the remaining intra-ASEAN tariffs and 
the large number of non-tariff barriers, creating an effective intellectual property regime, fully 
liberalising trade in services, and relaxing barriers to flows of capital and skilled labour in all sectors. 
If achieved, the AEC could be expected to increase production efficiency, attract more investment 
and generate more exports.16  
Progress is being made in Southeast Asian economic integration. Businesses are showing through 
their investment that they increasingly see ASEAN as an economic bloc. Cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions have been increasing through businesses seeking to operate widely in the ASEAN region 
and there have been cases of notable successes among ASEAN-based firms with a regional focus, 
such as the low-cost airline Air Asia, based in Malaysia. Other types of integration are taking place, 
14.  Etel Solingen, ‘ASEAN Cooperation: ‘The legacy of the economic crisis’, International Relations of the Asia Pacific, 5  
(1), 2005, p. 20.  
15.  ASEAN 2030: towards a borderless community – draft highlights, Asian Development Bank Institute, 2012, p. 21, 
accessed on 11 May 2013. 
16.  Ibid.; see the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint here.  
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such as the Iskander region in the southern Malayan peninsula, which as intended is drawing in 
substantial investment from Singapore.17 ASEAN is seeking to enhance the basis for economic 
cooperation in the ASEAN region by improving the ‘connectivity’ among the members in many 
physical and institutional areas, including substantial additional investment in infrastructure.18  
However, ASEAN faces many challenges in pursuing the AEC. ASEAN’s members include economies 
at widely varying levels of development (for example, the difference between Singapore, and Laos 
and Myanmar) and the members have not yet been prepared to develop either a harmonised 
internal tariff regime or a common external tariff policy.19 A second major issue is that while very 
substantial progress has been made in reducing tariff levels, non-tariff barriers (NTBs) also pose 
major obstacles to trade. Non-tariff barriers can range from cross-border barriers such as 
cumbersome customs procedures to internal technical barriers arising from differences in health and 
safety provisions, and in product quality and testing/certification procedures. It also remains to be 
seen whether ASEAN can strengthen its institutions to provide for security and certainty in 
implementing agreements and to provide effective mechanisms for dispute resolution. The ASEAN 
Charter adopted in 2008 endorses the importance of dispute settlement mechanisms and the 
Association is currently seeking to develop more effective mechanisms for this purpose.20 
ASEAN is continuing major efforts to secure the goals of the AEC, by 2015 and beyond that date. At 
the ASEAN Summit (in Brunei, 24–25 April 2013) ASEAN leaders commended reports from the 
Economic Ministers indicating that members were now compliant with 77 per cent of the measures 
required to implement an ASEAN Free Trade Area. Some members however continue to face 
difficulties in meeting the target requirements, including in the areas of reform of legal and 
regulatory structures. The communique issued at the end of the April 2013 Summit noted ongoing 
challenges ‘due to varying levels of development’.21  
In its recent 2012 report, the Asian Development Bank stated: 
Given its complexity and comprehensiveness, the AEC implementation has been slower than 
planned, and it is unlikely to be fully realised by 2015… For instance, implementing the AEC 
requires significant legal and institutional changes in ASEAN countries. This takes significant 
time. Eliminating non-tariff barriers, the establishment of an efficient trade facilitation system, 
full liberalization of services, free flow of skilled labor, and fully liberalizing capital flows are 
17.  Manu Bhaskaran, ‘Southeast Asian Economies: building the base for stronger, better distributed growth’, in Daljit 
Singh, ed., Southeast Asian Affairs 2013, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2013, pp. 17–39. 
18.  See Sanchita Basu Das, ed., Enhancing ASEAN’s connectivity, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2012. 
19.  ‘ASEAN’s integration goal is mired in constraints’, Oxford Analytica, 26 September 2012; Siow Yue Chia, ‘The ASEAN 
Economic Community: progress, challenges and prospects’, in Richard Baldwin, Masuhiro Kawai, and Ganeshan 
Wignaraja, eds, The future of the world trading system: Asian Perspectives, a VoxEU.org book, 2013, pp. 93–100, 
accessed 22 June 2013. 
20.  Professor Walter Woon, ‘The ASEAN Charter dispute settlement mechanism’, ASEAN Law Association, 10th General 
Assembly [October 2009], accessed 8 July 2013; The ASEAN Charter, Singapore, November 2007, p. 23, accessed 29 
July 2013.  
21.  ‘ASEAN summit outlines tentative progress’, Oxford Analytica, 1 May 2013. 
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particularly complex and difficult to reach agreement on, particularly without a strong central 
institution to coordinate discussions.22 
Continued pursuit of the AEC is a high priority for ASEAN. Sanchita Basu Das (Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies) commented recently that while the AEC is not likely to be achieved fully by the end of 
2015, it can be seen as ‘… an ongoing process for which all the right foundations have been laid’.23 
The ASEAN Political-Security Community 
In parallel with its programs for economic integration, ASEAN is pursuing an ‘ASEAN Political-Security 
Community’ (APSC).24 The ASEAN Political-Security Community concept was initiated by Indonesia 
and adopted as part of the ‘Bali Concord II’ in October 2003. The proposal was meant to be an 
evolutionary concept rather than one which sought a sharp change or departure in ASEAN practices. 
ASEAN’s central purpose from its outset was to help the members achieve a secure environment for 
internal stability and economic progress. The many years of meetings and discussions have been 
designed to a major degree to build up communication and increase trust. It can be argued, then, 
that fostering a sense of regional security has always been at the centre of ASEAN’s concerns and 
that the Political-Security Community is an extension of this role.  
In its ‘Blueprint’ for the Political-Security Community, ASEAN declares that, ‘It is envisaged that the 
APSC will bring ASEAN’s political and security cooperation to a higher plane. The APSC will ensure 
that the peoples and Member States of ASEAN will live in peace with one another and with the 
world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment’.25  The ASEAN Political-Security 
Community initiative aims to use ASEAN’s own mechanisms to resolve disputes among members and 
to pursue much closer cooperation on transnational security challenges including terrorism, 
narcotics, people-trafficking, and maritime security issues. The APSC reflects long-term emphases in 
ASEAN by ruling out an ASEAN defence pact, military alliance or joint foreign policy.26 ASEAN has, 
however, established a regular dialogue among its ministers for defence, the ASEAN Defence 
Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), which has convened since 2006 to increase communication and mutual 
awareness.27 
The ASEAN members have continued to pursue multiple strategies towards advancing security in the 
region. Individual members have cooperated on a bilateral and multilateral basis with both regional 
and external partners to gain improved coordination across borders and to increase interaction in a 
number of areas of counter-terrorism activities. ASEAN adopted a Declaration of Joint Action to 
22.  ASEAN 2030: Towards a borderless community – draft highlights, op. cit., p. 28. 
23.  Sanchita Basu Das, ‘Can the ASEAN Economic Community be achieved by 2015?’, ISEAS Perspectives, 11 October 
2012, p. 1, accessed 12 May 2013. 
24.  The proposal was adopted in 2003 as the ‘ASEAN Security Community’ but since 2007 has been referred to as the 
‘ASEAN Political-Security Community’. 
25.  Association of Southeast Asian Nations, The ASEAN Political-Security blueprint, Jakarta, the ASEAN Secretariat, 2009, 
p. 1.  
26.  East Asian Strategic Review 2012, National Institute of Defense Studies, Tokyo, 2012, p. 131. 
27.  ASEAN Secretariat, ‘ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM)’, accessed 8 July 2013.  The Ministerial Meetings are 
supplemented and supported by Senior Officials Meetings (ADMM-SOM). 
 
11 
                                                          
ASEAN and regional cooperation: recent developments and Australia’s interests 
Counter Terrorism at its summit in December 2001 and at its Cebu summit in January 2007 endorsed 
the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism. Cooperation has increased in useful ways in maritime 
security: since 2004 Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have conducted coordinated naval patrols 
and joint air surveillance operations to increase security in the Malacca Straits.28 Under the umbrella 
of the APSC, ASEAN has also developed an additional dialogue, the ASEAN Maritime Forum, to focus 
attention and promote studies on maritime security issues.29 All of these activities clearly contribute 
to a more secure ASEAN region. 
ASEAN is continuing to initiate additional measures to advance the goals of the Political-Security 
Community. The latest annual Foreign Ministers Meeting (in Brunei, 29–30 June 2013) noted that 
ASEAN expects to issue its first ASEAN Security Outlook document later in 2013 to gather together 
information on members’ security priorities and to promote transparency in security-related 
policies. A new institution, the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation, is being established in 
Jakarta to promote research on peace, conflict management and conflict resolution in the region. 
ASEAN is developing plans for a Regional Mine Action Centre and hopes to consider a proposal at the 
next ASEAN Summit later in 2013. The Foreign Ministers in their Brunei meeting also affirmed that 
‘… we remain committed to the development of a post-2015 ASEAN vision to meet the challenges of 
the future in order to promote peace, stability and prosperity in Southeast Asia and further deepen 
ASEAN integration, as well as to continue strategically positioning ASEAN in the evolving regional 
architecture and in the world at large’.30 In line with this commitment, the Foreign Ministers 
reaffirmed ASEAN’s support for members to attain the position of Non-Permanent Members of the 
United Nations Security Council (with candidatures to be pursued by Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, 
Vietnam and the Philippines successively from 2015 up to 2028).31 
ASEAN’s pursuit of the APSC at government-to-government level has also been accompanied by 
activities of non-state actors. The roles of civil society organisations in a number of countries have 
expanded substantially in the past two decades. Civil society organisations have a long history of 
activities in Thailand and the Philippines and the process of democratisation in Indonesia after 1998 
provided a further major expansion of scope for non-state groups. Civil society organisations have 
been notably active in Malaysia in recent years and also operate in other members, including (most 
28.  East Asian Strategic Review 2012, op. cit., p. 131; Sheldon W. Simon, ASEAN and its security offspring: facing new 
challenges, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, October 2007, pp. 6–9. 
29.  See ‘Concept paper for the establishment of an ASEAN Maritime Forum’, draft as of 8 September 2007. ASEAN has 
also promoted dialogue on maritime cooperation issues by instituting meetings of the ‘Expanded ASEAN Maritime 
Forum’, which will bring together government and non-government representatives from the ASEAN members along 
with the other members of the East Asia Summit (Australia, China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, 
Russian Federation and the United States). The first meeting of the expanded forum took place in Manila on 5 
October 2012; see Chairman’s statement, 1st Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, Manila, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, 9 
October 2013.  
30.  ‘Joint Communique, 46th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, 29-30 June 
2013’, accessed 26 July 2013. 
31.  Ibid. 
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recently) in Myanmar.32 Discussions within ASEAN have been fostered by the network of the ASEAN 
Institutes for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) which has on twenty seven  occasions 
sponsored a major annual ’second track’ conference in Kuala Lumpur on regional political and 
security cooperation issues, the Asia-Pacific Roundtable. ASEAN-ISIS also sponsors the ASEAN 
People’s Assembly, which was organised after 2000 to increase interactions between ASEAN and 
non-state sectors, and other groups have also sought to make inputs. The activities of non-state 
groups have not always been welcomed by the more autocratic of the member countries, but civil 
society organisation activities have contributed to enhanced perceptions of political community 
across the ASEAN region.33  
While active efforts to pursue the goals of the APSC continue, the ASEAN states face significant 
ongoing obstacles to securing the ambitious declared goals of the APSC, both in relation to political 
accord and security cooperation. In relation to the issue of political order in the ASEAN region, the 
APSC Blueprint states: 
The APSC shall promote political development in adherence to the principle of democracy, the 
rule of law and good governance, respect for and promotion of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms as described in the ASEAN Charter. It shall be a means by which ASEAN Member States 
can pursue closer interaction and cooperation to forge shared norms and create common 
mechanisms to achieve ASEAN’s goals in the political and security fields.34 
It may be noted in this context that the ASEAN members continue to be highly diverse in political 
character and patterns of internal order. There are at present wide variations among ASEAN’s 
members in policies and practices in relation to ‘democracy’ and ‘good governance’ in areas 
including political openness, extent of electoral competition and scope for activities by civil society 
organisations.  Indonesia and the Philippines have pluralist regimes with substantial political 
competition, which has included changes of ruling figures and parties in national elections. Thailand 
has a pluralist political system whose operations have included changes of government through 
national elections, but the country has in the past decade faced serious internal political divisions 
between contending political forces. Malaysia and Singapore have pluralist systems in which the 
incumbent ruling parties have maintained power since independence (albeit in the face of recent 
increases in support for opposition forces, notably in Malaysia). Myanmar, after decades of military 
dominance, is pursuing political liberalisation but this process is still ongoing and the outcome 
remains uncertain (see Section III below). Cambodian politics since UN involvement and elections in 
1993 have been for many years dominated by one ruling party (although the 2013 elections 
produced a strong showing by the political opposition). Vietnam and Laos have regimes dominated 
by ruling Communist parties, with constraints on participation and on roles for representative 
32.  On the role of NGOs and civil society organisations in ASEAN see Terence Chong and Stefanie Elies, eds, An ASEAN 
Community for all: exploring the scope for civil society engagement, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Singapore, November 
2011, accessed 26 July 2013. 
33. Roberts, ASEAN regionalism: cooperation, values and institutionalization, op. cit., pp. 102–126; Chong and Elies, eds, 
An ASEAN Community for all: exploring the scope for civil society engagement, op. cit., pp. 9–34. 
34.  ‘ASEAN Political-Security Community blueprint’, op. cit., pp. 1–2. 
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institutions. Brunei is an absolute monarchy with an appointed legislature.35  ASEAN has from its 
inception included members with widely varying political systems and this diversity has not 
prevented the Association from pursuing extensive cooperation. Nonetheless, the ASEAN members 
clearly do not as yet have a common basis in approaches to governance and styles of political order 
that can readily underpin accord on political and security issues.36   
The ASEAN members, in addition, face some substantial issues in relation to internal security and 
inter-state relations. Two members, Thailand and the Philippines, have had serious ongoing internal 
conflicts involving Islamic movements (although some progress has been made in pursuing 
negotiations in the Philippines), the Philippines faces the last significant Communist resistance 
movement in Southeast Asia, and Myanmar has had ongoing conflicts between the central 
government and minority ethnic communities.37 While no outright or sustained armed conflict has 
ever occurred between member countries since the inauguration of ASEAN, research (including 
extensive interviews and surveys) by Christopher Roberts (Australian National University) has shown 
that there continue to be considerable problems of lack of trust and confidence among ASEAN 
members which stand in the way of a sense of ‘community’ on security issues.38 Tensions and 
conflict have certainly continued to be evident in some inter-state relationships. Thailand and 
Cambodia have had a dispute over an ancient temple at Preah Vihear which resulted in several 
armed clashes between 2008 and 2011, and in early 2013 Malaysia experienced an armed incursion 
by dissidents from the southern Philippines into the state of Sabah (see Section III below). These 
issues illustrate that political diversity, historical grievances and contending nationalisms continue to 
pose challenges to the spirit of regional accord sought in the ASEAN Political-Security Community.39  
The ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community  
The ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC), the third strand in the ASEAN Community project, is a 
reflection of views in ASEAN that the pursuit of closer cooperation in the economic and security 
areas should also be accompanied by increased emphasis on developing a shared sense of identity 
among the member countries and peoples.40 Rodolfo Severino (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), 
35.  Shaun Narine, ‘Asia, ASEAN and the question of sovereignty’, in Mark Beeson and Richard Stubbs, eds, Routledge 
handbook of Asian regionalism, Routledge, London, 2012, pp. 155–165; Sebastian Strangio, ‘Post poll deadlock test 
Cambodian stability’, Asia Times online, 2 August 2013, accessed 2 August 2013. For concise overviews of recent 
political developments in all ten ASEAN members see Daljit Singh, ed., Southeast Asian Affairs 2013, Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2013; see also Robert Bayley and Clark D. Neher, Southeast Asia in the new 
international era, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 2013.  
36.  Roberts, ASEAN regionalism: cooperation, values and institutionalization, op. cit., p. 182. 
37.  International Crisis Group, ‘Thailand: the evolving conflict in the South’, Asia Report, no. 241, 11 December 2012, 
accessed on 29 July 2013; International Crisis Group, ‘The Philippines: dismantling rebel groups’, Asia Report, no. 248, 
19 June 2013,  accessed 29 July 2013; International Crisis Group, ‘Myanmar: storm clouds on the horizon’, Asia 
Report, no. 238, 12 November 2012, accessed 29 July 2013.  
38.  Roberts, ASEAN regionalism: cooperation, values and institutionalization, op. cit., pp. 146–173. 
39.  See Christopher B. Roberts, ‘The future of regionalism in East and Southeast Asia’, in Andrew Tan, ed., East and 
Southeast Asia: international relations and security perspectives, Routledge, London, 2012, pp. 279–290. 
40.  Julio S. Amador III, ‘ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community: an assessment of its institutional prospects’, Foreign Service 
Institute, Pasay City, Philippines, 28 February 2011, accessed 24 March 2013. 
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a former Secretary-General of ASEAN, has argued that Southeast Asia cannot be an enduring security 
and economic community without being a socio-cultural community.41 
ASEAN has set out highly ambitious goals for the ASCC. The plan of action stated: 
Social inequities can threaten economic development and in turn undermine political regimes. 
Economic instability can exacerbate poverty, unemployment, hunger, illness and disease. Social 
instability can emerge from environmental scarcity or the inequitable distribution among 
stakeholders of the use of environmental assets. Failure to address these critical and persistent 
social issues can further cause both economic and political dislocations. 42 
ASEAN and its members have made some progress towards a number of areas of socio-economic 
development. For example, the gap between the average GDP per capita of the older six members 
compared to the four newer members (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) has narrowed from 
over eleven times in 1990 to four times in 2010.43 ASEAN is continuing to pursue the goals of the 
ASCC in a number of areas. ASEAN has, for example, endorsed a proposal for a Young Professionals 
Volunteer Corps to complement the ASEAN Youth Volunteer Programme initiated by Malaysia. 
Cooperation is also being pursued actively in the area of managing responses to natural disasters. 
One major focus is to develop the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on 
Disaster Management with contributions from both member states and dialogue partners. Closer 
cooperation in disaster management is also being encouraged by building enhanced early warning 
capacities, including improved weather forecast systems, among ASEAN members and dialogue 
partners.44  
However, progress towards socio-cultural community goals will continue to be affected by ASEAN’s 
style of consensus-based decision-making and the challenge of translating declared objectives into 
concrete policies. This issue has been illustrated in the area of forest destruction and the regional 
‘haze’ problem in which the burning of forests in parts of Indonesia has created substantial 
atmospheric pollution, which has spread from Indonesia to neighbouring Malaysia and Singapore. 
These problems attracted considerable attention after 1997 and were evident again in mid-2013, 
when fires in Indonesia (particularly on Sumatra) caused levels of pollution in Singapore and 
Malaysia that led to government health warnings and some tension between Indonesia and its two 
fellow ASEAN members.45 
In the years since the haze issue attracted major attention in 1997, ASEAN has tried to address the 
matter through a number of agreements, especially the 2002 ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary 
Haze Pollution. While numerous dialogues and studies have been pursued, the impact of the 
41.  MC Abad Jr, ‘Constructing the Social ASEAN’, The Asia Pacific Roundtable Series, Institute for Strategic and 
International Studies, Kuala Lumpur, 2008, pp. 8–9. 
42.  ‘The ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Plan of Action’, accessed 24 March 2013. 
43.  ASEAN 2030: Towards a borderless community – draft highlights, op. cit., p. 6. 
44.  ‘Joint Communique, 46th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, 29-30 June 
2013’, accessed 26 July 2013. 
45.  ‘Singapore chokes as fires rage on Sumatra’, The Weekend Australian, 22–23 June 2013. 
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Agreement has been limited by the inability so far of Indonesia to ratify it, particularly because of 
resistance in Indonesia’s legislature, where the Agreement has been seen as likely to damage the 
country’s economic interests.46 Indonesia, the prime source of the haze pollution problem, also has 
comparatively limited administrative capacities to handle forest management issues and the burning 
of land has been seen widely as the cheapest form of forest clearance. Political action has been 
complicated by the process of decentralisation in the country, which has given substantial additional 
authority to local and regional administrations in areas including land use and resource 
development.47 ASEAN has continued to discuss the issue and in mid-2013 the Indonesian 
Government undertook to renew efforts to have the 2002 ASEAN Agreement ratified, but no rapid 
resolution of the haze issue was in sight.48  
The persistence of the haze issue both underscores the relevance of the goals of the ASEAN Socio-
Cultural Community and also the challenges facing ASEAN states in implementing them. 
The ASEAN Charter and human rights discussions 
After ASEAN adopted the ‘ASEAN Community’ commitment in 2003, there was widespread 
recognition in ASEAN that its own organisation needed to be reviewed and updated.49 ASEAN 
accordingly developed a Charter for the Association and the Charter has led to an increased focus on 
ASEAN’s approach towards human rights issues in its cooperation. 
The Charter was endorsed in Singapore on 20 November 2007 and adopted in December 2008 and it 
introduced some substantial changes and adaptations to ASEAN.50 The Charter gives ASEAN for the 
first time a legal personality as an inter-governmental organisation. ASEAN has status under 
international law and can make agreements in its own right. The Charter affirms the status of the 
Secretary-General as being at ministerial level, with roles including participation in ASEAN Summits 
and other meetings, and submitting an annual report to the Summit on ASEAN activities. Basic 
principles for ASEAN’s operation are set out, including provisions for acceptance of new members. 
The Charter also establishes formally and outlines the institutional structure of ASEAN and it also 
introduced some changes to this. These changes included holding Summits twice each year, 
introducing a new ASEAN Coordinating Council and two new Deputy Secretary-General Positions and 
providing for a human rights body for ASEAN.51 
46.  L. Jackson Ewing and Elizabeth Mace, ‘Transboundary haze in Southeast Asia: challenges and pathways forward’, NTS 
Alert, S. Rajaratnam School for International Studies, Singapore, October 2012, accessed 24 March 2013.  
47  Simon Tay and Nicholas Fang, ‘Hazy issues cast a pall yet again’, Today (Singapore), 29 April 2013; Lee Poh Onn, ‘No 
end in sight to haze dilemma’, ISEAS Perspective, 24 June 2013, accessed 1 July 2013. 
48.  ‘Haze crisis exposed governance gaps in South-east Asia’, Oxford Analytica, 12 July 2013. 
49.  For further background on the process of developing the ASEAN Charter see Frank Frost, ASEAN’s regional and 
multilateral relations: recent developments and Australia’s interests, op. cit., pp. 20–26. 
50.  The ASEAN Charter, Singapore, November 2007, accessed 29 July 2013. 
51.  Mely Caballero-Anthony, ‘The ASEAN Charter: an opportunity missed or one that cannot be missed?’, Southeast 
Asian Affairs 2008, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2008, pp. 76–77. 
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The Charter represented a step forward for ASEAN but debate has continued about the Association’s 
institutional character and whether it has the capacities and administrative resources necessary to 
fulfil its ambitious goals (see Section III below).  
One significant outcome of the adoption of the ASEAN Charter has been an increased focus on 
human rights issues in the ASEAN region, although this process has proceeded in a cautious and very 
gradualist manner. 
In line with Article 14 of the Charter, ASEAN members established the ASEAN Intergovernmental 
Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) in 2009. Two other bodies, the ASEAN Committee on the 
Rights of Migrant Workers and the ASEAN Commission on Women and Children have also been 
established (in 2007 and 2010 respectively). These institutions do not possess any procedures for 
compliance or enforcement, which means that there is no mechanism to submit complaints and to 
receive binding judgements or remedies. The AICHR has proceeded cautiously so far. It has, 
however, pursued its mandate to discuss strategies for the promotion and protection of human 
rights and to develop an ASEAN Human Rights Declaration.52 
The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights began drafting a human rights 
declaration in 2011. The process of discussion was largely an intergovernmental one, but 
Commission representatives from Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand did conduct informal 
public consultations and Commission officials held two formal consultations with selected civil 
society groups in 2012.53 The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD) was then adopted formally at 
the ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh on 20 November 2012.54 The Declaration addresses civil, political, 
economic, cultural and social rights and gives details on how ASEAN members understand these 
rights. A notable feature of the Declaration is that sections 22–25 outline fundamental freedoms, 
including the freedoms of thought; conscience and religion; opinion and expression; peaceful 
assembly; and participation in ‘periodic and genuine’ elections. Mathew Davies (Australian National 
University) has observed that, ‘These political freedoms, while not as detailed as those contained in 
the European and American regional systems, do describe a system of representative government 
that is far in advance of the situation prevalent in many ASEAN member states’.55 
The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration also included some significant qualifications. Principle 6, for 
example, states that enjoyment of human rights should ‘… be balanced with the performance of 
corresponding duties’ to other individuals, the community and society. Principle 7 provides that 
‘…the realisation of human rights must be considered in the regional and national context bearing in 
mind different political, economic, legal, social, cultural, historical and religious backgrounds’. 
52.  Daniel Aguirre, Human rights the ASEAN Way, Jurist—Forum, 10 January 2013, accessed 11 May 2013; Katherine G. 
Southwick, ‘Bumpy road to the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration’, Asia Pacific Bulletin, Honolulu, East West Center, 
22 January 2013, accessed 11 May 2013. 
53.  Southwick, op. cit., p. 1. 
54.  Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ‘ASEAN Human Rights Declaration’. 
55.  Mathew Davies, ‘The ASEAN Synthesis: human rights, non-intervention and the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration’, 
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 14 (2), August 2013, pp. 27–34, p. 31.  
 
17 
                                                          
ASEAN and regional cooperation: recent developments and Australia’s interests 
Furthermore, human rights can be limited on a variety of grounds including ‘national security’, 
‘public order’ and ‘public morality’.56  
The qualified nature of the commitment to human rights in the Declaration was criticised both 
within the ASEAN region and internationally.57 The Declaration can, however, be seen as a further 
step by ASEAN to widen its agenda by explicitly acknowledging the significance of human rights 
issues both at national and regional levels. The Declaration was also a reflection of the challenges 
facing ASEAN in accommodating the national sensitivities of its diverse membership. Bridget Welsh 
(Singapore Management University) has recently commented on these issues: 
The AHRD reflects the lowest common denominator position in ASEAN on rights. As the region 
has been transforming, there are underlying tensions that go beyond security and extend to 
rights and democracy. There are also tensions between rigid commitments to sovereignty with 
simultaneous pressures from regional integration and transnational forces. The consensus that 
was reached was one that revealed some of these tensions, with more authoritarian states in the 
region unwilling to adopt more liberal and inclusive approaches towards rights, and yet others 
leading the way in bringing ASEAN onto the international stage as a regional grouping in the 
developing world that leads the way for others to follow.58 
ASEAN, national sovereignty and regional community 
ASEAN is making progress in its pursuit of deeper cooperation. It has secured some significant goals 
in economic cooperation and it is taking cautious steps to extend its activities into additional areas 
such as human rights. However, the major differences among its members in economic structure 
and political systems continue to pose major challenges to cooperative efforts. It is difficult to 
pursue economic integration policies among members whose economies and administrative 
capacities vary so widely. It is a major challenge to develop approaches towards the definition and 
promotion of human rights values and principles when the governments of members vary so widely 
from liberal and pluralist systems with a substantial role for civil society, to states which continue to 
have more autocratic regimes and limited scope for legally-sanctioned political participation or 
opposition. 
A key issue continuing to confront ASEAN’s efforts to develop its community projects is that many 
members remain highly sensitive to issues of sovereignty and are reluctant to consider delegating 
significant authority to ASEAN multilateral institutions. Commitments to the principle of national 
sovereignty and to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs were central features of 
ASEAN’s founding values, and to ‘the ASEAN Way’. In practice, ASEAN members have moved a long 
way away from a strict adherence to unchallenged national sovereignty and the non-interference 
principle. Members have frequently commented on each other’s affairs and it is quite clear that 
56.  Davies, op. cit.; Paula Gerber, ‘ASEAN Human Rights Declaration: a step forward or a slide backwards?’, The 
Conversation, 21 November 2012, accessed 14 May 2013.  
57.  Bridget Welsh, ‘Divided or together: Southeast Asia in 2012’, in Daljit Singh, ed., Southeast Asian Affairs 2013, 
Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013, pp. 6–8; see also Davies, op. cit. 
58.  Welsh, ‘Divided or together: Southeast Asia in 2012’, op. cit., pp. 7–8. 
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many policy areas raise issues that go beyond national borders, as in the areas of human rights 
concerns and the problems posed by environmental pollution.  
However, the ASEAN region is one where national sovereignty has been a sensitive issue for peoples 
and states which in almost all cases faced colonial rule and attempted major power interference or 
intervention. Many members are therefore resistant to concepts which would impose sanctions for 
non-compliance with ASEAN programs (for example, in relation to trade liberalisation or the 
protection of human rights). These attitudes pose challenges for ASEAN as it seeks to extend and 
deepen its cooperation. Shaun Narine (St Thomas University, Canada) has observed: 
Today ASEAN is in an awkward position. On the surface, its stated goals and aspirations seem to 
lead towards the creation of an effective regional organization that must be capable of 
exercising a certain level of influence over the domestic conduct of its member states. At the 
same time, it is evident that many, if not most, of the ASEAN states are not prepared to seriously 
compromise their sovereignty in order to strengthen the organization.59 
This tension between ASEAN’s aspirations and its members' sensitiveness over  sovereignty is likely 
to persist into the future. It is a major reason why ASEAN’s pursuit of a regional community among 
its members is likely to need to continue for at least several decades beyond 2015.60 
II: ASEAN and wider regional cooperation 
Along with pursuing cooperation among its own members, ASEAN’s second key goal has been to 
engage the major external powers with interests in Southeast Asia in regular dialogues on security 
and economic issues. This strategy has been a way for ASEAN to help mediate and manage the 
interests of the major powers in Southeast Asia, while seeking to forestall the danger of outright 
competition and intervention which was a dominant problem in the region for five decades from the 
1940s.61 As a part of this process, ASEAN has also sought to play a role in fostering institutional 
dialogue and cooperation on a wider regional basis in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific regions. These 
efforts have, since the mid-1990s, been one of ASEAN’s most prominent areas of emphasis and of 
interaction with its dialogue partners, including Australia. The major expressions of this have been 
the ASEAN Regional Forum; the ASEAN Plus Three process; the East Asia Summit; the ASEAN 
Defence Ministers Meeting Plus process; and (most recently) the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership. 
59.  Shaun Narine, ‘Asia, ASEAN and the question of sovereignty’, in Mark Beeson and Richard Stubbs, eds, Routledge 
handbook of Asian regionalism, Routledge, London, 2012, pp. 155–165, p. 160. 
60.  Roberts, ASEAN regionalism: cooperation, values and institutionalization, op. cit., pp. 176–187. 
61.  On Southeast Asian states’ approaches towards the major powers see Evelyn Goh, ‘Great Powers and hierarchical 
order in Southeast Asia: analyzing regional security strategies’, International Security, 32 (3), Winter 2007–08, pp. 
113–157 and Evelyn Goh, ‘Institutions and the great power bargain in Southeast Asia’, in Ralf Emmers, ed., ASEAN 
and the institutionalization of Southeast Asia, Routledge, London, 2012, pp. 105–121. 
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ASEAN and the major powers 
Carlyle A. Thayer (Australian Defence Force Academy) has summed up ASEAN’s approach towards 
the major powers in the following terms: 
ASEAN has sought to enmesh all the major powers through engagement with ASEAN-centric 
multilateral institutions, including the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference and the ASEAN 
Regional Forum. ASEAN insists that it remain in the driver's seat in the region’s security 
architecture and that the norms embodied in the ASEAN Way guide the decision-making process 
and work programs of regional security institutions. ASEAN also seeks to position itself so that it 
does not have to choose between China and United States. 62 
ASEAN’s two most important external relationships are those with the United States and China. The 
United States has had longstanding relationships in the ASEAN region. The US has bilateral alliances 
with Thailand and the Philippines and substantial security interactions with other ASEAN members 
including Singapore and Malaysia. The US is a major source of investment to the ASEAN region and 
trade is also substantial, although in recent years its relative strength as a trading partner has 
declined in relation to China.  
The US has been a dialogue partner with ASEAN since 1977 and the US Secretary of State has been a 
regular participant in the Post-Ministerial Conferences. The US was cautious about ASEAN’s interest 
in developing wider regional cooperation after the end of the Cold War but it did join the ARF at its 
inauguration in 1994. The Bush administration after 2001 pursued enhanced economic relations and 
appointed an ambassador to ASEAN in 2008. Since 2009 the Obama administration has given further 
emphasis to ASEAN. The US acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in July 2009 and in 
November 2009 President Obama held the first meeting at leadership level between the US and 
ASEAN. The US’s profile in ASEAN has also been advanced by its acceptance (along with Russia) as a 
member of the East Asia Summit, which President Obama attended in 2011 and 2012.63 
The priority of Southeast Asia and the ASEAN region to the US has been underscored in the revision 
of US foreign and security policies towards East Asia since 2011. The US announced in January 2012 
that it would ‘rebalance’ its defence force structure towards the Asia-Pacific and quarantine defence 
budget cuts from that region (the term ‘pivot’ was initially widely used to refer to this policy, but has 
been replaced by use of the term ‘rebalance’). Rebalancing will involve some changes of force 
deployments (including an increase in naval deployments from 55 to 60 per cent of overall US 
strength) and will also involve increased rotation of forces through the region (including through 
deployments in Australia, Guam and the Philippines and increased use of Singapore for naval 
rotations).64  
62.  Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘Deference/Defiance: Southeast Asia, China and the South China Sea’, presentation to panel on 
Difference/Diffusion, Deference/Defiance: unpacking China-Southeast Asia relations, International Studies 
Association Annual Convention, Hilton San Francisco Union Square, San Francisco, 5 April 2013, pp. 26–27. 
63.  US Department of State, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), accessed 12 May 2013. 
64.  Thayer, ‘Deference/Defiance: Southeast Asia, China and the South China Sea’, op. cit., pp. 27–30. 
 
20 
                                                          
ASEAN and regional cooperation: recent developments and Australia’s interests 
The US also hopes to enhance its economic and trade relations with the ASEAN members. The US’s 
trade with ASEAN amounted to US$186.6 billion in 2010 (9.1 per cent of ASEAN total trade) and in 
November 2012 the two sides launched the US-ASEAN Enhanced Economic Engagement program, 
designed as a new framework for trade and investment cooperation.65 The US is also pursuing closer 
trade relations with several ASEAN members through its Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement 
(see below). The measures being pursued through the ‘rebalance’ overall have the potential to add 
additional weight to the US political, economic and strategic presence in the ASEAN region. 
ASEAN’s relationship with China has changed profoundly in the past forty years. After the 
inauguration of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the regime was viewed with suspicion in the 
non-Communist states of Southeast Asia, as it assisted Communist parties in the region and gave 
support to the armed struggle of the Vietnamese communist regime and later to the Pol Pot regime 
in Cambodia. The end of the Cold War, and the Cambodia peace agreement, along with China’s 
process of economic reform from 1978, initiated a new phase in regional relations. China normalised 
relations with all of the states in Southeast Asia by 1990 and in 1991 became a consultative partner 
with ASEAN. Relations expanded through the 1990s and in 1996 China became a full dialogue 
partner with ASEAN. In February 1997 the two sides formalised their relations by establishing the 
ASEAN-China Joint Cooperation Committee and in 2003 China acceded to the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation.66 
ASEAN’s efforts to ‘enmesh’ China in cooperative relations led to an economic cooperation 
agreement in 2002 and the development of an agreement to establish the ASEAN-China Free Trade 
Area. The latter agreement came into force in 2010 for ASEAN’s six ‘developed economies’ (i.e. 
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) and will cover the other four 
members by 2015. In 2003 the two sides also raised their relations to that of a ‘strategic partnership’ 
(later elevated to a ‘comprehensive partnership’ in 2007). The ASEAN members are keenly aware of 
the rising profile of China and of its increasing defence capabilities. ASEAN has engaged in a complex 
pattern of interactions in relation to the South China Sea and tensions have risen over these issues 
since 2009 (see Section III below). China simultaneously is a highly important economic partner for 
all ASEAN members, with trade in 2010 amounting to US$232 billion (11.3 per cent of the ASEAN 
total). Carlyle Thayer has written: 
China’s economic rise has altered the region’s political economy and absorbed regional states in 
a production network feeding into China’s export oriented manufacturing industries. China not 
only buys primary commodities and natural resources, particularly oil and gas, but electronic 
parts and components. China’s economic rise also has resulted in the displacement of the United 
States as the major trading partner for most Southeast Asian states.67 
65.  Sanchita Basu Das and Termsak Chalempalanupap, Can ASEAN keep aiming for new goals without having reached old 
ones?, ISEAS Perspective, 17 December 2012, p. 3, accessed 3 July 2013; note that statistics for ASEAN trade with the 
US, China and Japan are from this source. See also Fact Sheet: the growing prominence of US-ASEAN trade relations, 
Washington DC, Office of the United States Trade Representative, 13 June 2013, accessed 27 June 2013. 
66.  Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘Deference/Defiance: Southeast Asia, China and the South China Sea’, op. cit., p. 5. 
67.  Ibid. 
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Japan is another highly important partner for ASEAN. Japan and ASEAN have had multilateral 
discussions since 1973 and Japan became a formal dialogue partner in 1977. Japan has been a very 
significant economic partner for ASEAN since the 1970s and Japanese investment and aid have been 
major factors in the ASEAN region’s economic progress. Trade between Japan and ASEAN was 
$206.6 billion in 2010 (10.1 per cent of the ASEAN total) and Japan is continuing to make substantial 
contributions to ASEAN’s projects for deeper integration. The pattern of trade relations has changed 
substantially: while the ASEAN region up to the 1970s was primarily a supplier of raw materials to 
Japan, manufactured exports have risen greatly, as ASEAN members have become closely involved in 
regional production networks.68 ASEAN and Japan have cooperated in a number of areas of common 
interest on regional security, including disaster relief and counter-terrorism.  
Japan has recently moved to reaffirm its relationships with ASEAN and its members. This has been 
seen as a reflection partly of the tensions between Japan and China over disputed islands in the East 
China Sea (the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands) which have placed pressure on economic and diplomatic 
relations.69 Japan is accordingly pursuing measures to extend and deepen economic relations with 
major ASEAN economies, and has also increased its focus on the territorial disputes in the South 
China Sea. For example, it has pursued a program to provide up to ten patrol boats to the Philippines 
(see Section III below).70 
ASEAN has also actively developed its interactions with other major partners.71 The European Union 
is a substantial trade partner and maintains a wide ranging dialogue with ASEAN.72 With India, 
ASEAN’s relations have expanded as India’s economy has developed rapidly and in a more outward 
looking manner and the two sides concluded a trade agreement in 2009. ASEAN’s relations with 
South Korea have included extensive cooperation in the ASEAN Plus Three process and in the East 
Asia Summit; the two parties reached trade agreements in 2007 and 2009. Russia has been 
comparatively less significant as an economic partner, although it has been prominent in areas 
including arms supplies and energy cooperation, and Russia joined the East Asia Summit with the US 
in 2011.73 
68.  ‘Japan-ASEAN relations’, ASEAN Japan Centre, accessed 12 May 2013; AKP Mochtan, ‘Four decades of an ASEAN-
Japan partnership’, The Jakarta Post, 19 January 2013. 
69.  See Dangerous waters: China-Japan relations on the rocks, International Crisis Group, Asia Report, no. 245, 8 April 
2013, accessed 14 May 2013. 
70.  Prashanth Parameswaran, Japan’s ASEAN charm offensive, The Diplomat, 22 January 2013, accessed 14 July 2013; 
‘Japan moving closer to Asean’, The Bangkok Post, 4 May 2013.  
71.  For concise summaries of ASEAN’s external relations with dialogue partners see ‘External relations’, ASEAN 
Secretariat, accessed 27 June 2013. 
72  ASEAN members, along with other Asian states, also hold dialogues with the EU member states in the Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM) process; Australia is one of the 51 participating countries—see Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, ‘Asia-Europe Meeting’, accessed 8 July 2013. For a recent assessment of ASEM see Julie Gilson, ‘The Asia-
Europe Meeting (ASEM)’, in Mark Beeson and Richard Stubbs, eds, Routledge handbook of Asian regionalism, 
Routledge, London, 2012, pp. 394–405. 
73.  ‘External relations’, ASEAN Secretariat, op. cit. 
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ASEAN and wider regional institutional cooperation 
All these dialogue relationships reflect ASEAN’s commitment to maintain balanced and wide-ranging 
interactions with all the major external powers with interests in Southeast and East Asia. The second 
major external dimension of ASEAN’s efforts to promote a stable economic and security 
environment has been its contribution to the development of new and wider regional institutions. 
Donald K. Emmerson (Stanford University) has commented that, ‘[ASEAN’s] creative diplomacy in 
spinning off one multilateral forum after another has earned it global respect as the unexcelled 
impresario of East Asian regionalism’.74 Since the early 1990s, ASEAN has pursued ‘creative 
diplomacy’ in several major institutional directions. 
The ASEAN Regional Forum 
ASEAN’s first major effort in wider institutional development was the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). 
The ARF was initiated in 1994 to extend ASEAN’s role in sponsoring dialogue on security issues in the 
East Asia region. It was conceived as a ‘process not an institution’.75 The ARF now has 27 participants 
including the ASEAN ten, the US, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.76 
The Forum was conceived as a group that would be inclusive in membership but with ASEAN playing 
the leading role.77 The Forum’s method and approach were clearly patterned after those of ASEAN 
and the ‘ASEAN Way’: the 1995 chairman’s statement affirmed that, ‘The ARF process shall move at 
a pace comfortable to all participants … The approach shall be evolutionary … Decisions of the ARF 
shall be made through consensus after careful and extensive consultations among all participants’.78  
ARF meetings are held at Foreign Minister-level annually in July, in conjunction with the ASEAN Post-
Ministerial Conference. The ARF has minimal institutionalisation, consensus decision making and 
uses both ‘first and second track’ (i.e. official level and NGO/academic level) diplomacy.79 The ARF 
agreed in 1995 on a gradual three-stage evolution of confidence-building, preventive diplomacy and 
in the longer term, approaches to conflict resolution.80  
74.  Donald K. Emmerson, Challenging ASEAN: the US pivot through Southeast Asian eyes, Global Asia, 7 (4), December 
2012, accessed 30 July 2013.  
75.  Barry Desker, ‘Is the ARF obsolete?’, IDSS Commentaries, 20 July 2006, accessed on 12 July 2013. 
76.  See the ARF website here. ARF members are Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, European 
Union (Presidency), India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New 
Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Russia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, 
Timor-Leste, Thailand, USA and Vietnam. 
77.  Rodolfo Severino, Southeast Asia in search of an ASEAN Community, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 
2006, p. 192. 
78.  Ibid. 
79.  The ‘second track’ discussions are conducted particularly by the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific 
(CSCAP)—see the CSCAP website here. 
80.  Barry Desker, ‘The future of the ASEAN Regional Forum’, Perspectives, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 
Singapore, October 2001. 
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The Forum’s plenary and inter-sessional discussions have had some practical results. These include 
the issuing of annual defence policy statements and additional White Papers, which contribute to 
greater ‘transparency’; military exchanges at staff college level; growing involvement of defence 
officials in ARF discussions; and the creation of an ARF Register of Experts/Eminent Persons, who can 
be called on by Forum members in conflict situations.81 Since 2009 the ARF has also sponsored 
Voluntary Disaster Response Exercises. The exercises were inaugurated by the Philippines and the 
US and a further round was held in Thailand in May 2013.82  
The ARF is so far generally considered to have been a modest success as a useful vehicle for 
discussion and confidence-building.83 However, the ARF’s premium on non-confrontation means 
that it does not have a mandate to intervene directly in security disputes. The Forum’s limits were 
illustrated clearly during the crisis over East Timor in 1999. Although the crisis involved a core 
member of ASEAN (Indonesia), the ARF was not able itself to take any significant action, although 
several ASEAN members did take part in the subsequent United Nations-sponsored peacekeeping 
deployments.84 It is, therefore, not clear how much further the ARF is likely to be able to extend its 
role in security dialogue in the region. Its membership is wide and diverse and finding a consensus 
among the members has not been easy. It is not in a position to address directly some of the most 
significant security issues in the Asia-Pacific region, such as the situation in relation to Taiwan, the 
North Korean nuclear issue or the situation in Kashmir (because particular member countries would 
veto such attempts). Having achieved its original aims for ASEAN, the Forum now faces the challenge 
of whether and how it can extend its role and relevance to its members.85 
ASEAN Plus Three 
ASEAN’s second major effort in wider regional dialogue was the ASEAN Plus Three process, a forum 
with a specifically East Asian focus which brings together the ten ASEAN members with China, Japan 
and the Republic of Korea. 
There was some support within East Asia for an ‘Asia-focused’ form of cooperation from at least the 
early 1990s when Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad proposed an ‘East Asia Economic 
Group’ which would have an exclusively Asian membership. At this time, the concept of an East 
Asian-focused grouping did not meet with thoroughgoing approval in the region. Japan, in particular, 
did not support the concept, not least because of concerns that China could be a dominant force 
within such a grouping.86 Furthermore, attention on regional cooperation in the early 1990s was 
81.  Simon, op. cit., p. 23. 
82.  Catherin Dalpino, ‘Multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific’, Comparative Connections, May 2013, accessed 2 July 2013. 
83.  See Sheldon Simon, ‘The ASEAN Regional Forum: beyond the talk shop?’, NBR Analysis Brief, 11 July 2013, accessed 
29 July 2013. 
84.  Mely C. Anthony, Regionalisation of peace in Asia: experience and prospects of ASEAN, ARF and UN partnership, 
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, Working Paper, no. 42, January 2003, pp. 16–18. 
85. Ralf Emmers, ‘ASEAN Regional Forum: time to move towards preventative diplomacy’, RSIS Commentaries’, 25 
October 2007. 
86. Chang-gun Park, ‘Japan’s emerging role in promoting regional integration in East Asia: towards an East Asian 
Integration Region (EAIR)’, Journal of International and Area Studies, 13 (1), 2006, pp. 53–72. 
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focused on the development of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping of Asia-
Pacific economies, which had a wider membership including the US.  
However a series of factors from the mid-1990s increased support for an East Asian-focused 
grouping. These included: the traumatic impact of the Asian Financial Crisis after mid-1997, which 
prompted many regional states to consider the desirability of greater cooperation to forestall any 
future crisis and to add greater ‘weight’ for Asia in relations with international institutions such as 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the advent of greater regional cooperation in Europe and in 
North America; and the growing impact of China’s dynamic growth. All these developments 
contributed to the opening up of ‘political space’ for an East Asian grouping.87 
The ‘ASEAN Plus Three’ process was developed from a meeting of the ASEAN members and China, 
Japan and South Korea in Kuala Lumpur in 1997. ASEAN Plus Three (APT) is not a formalised 
organisation but is a loose cooperative framework based on conferences and dialogue. The APT 
members have pursued dialogues at several different levels simultaneously: among all thirteen 
members, among the ASEAN ‘ten’ and one other member (which has enabled China and Japan, in 
particular, to maintain and develop their own specific relationships with ASEAN), and among the 
three Northeast Asian members (China, Japan and South Korea)—who held their first trilateral 
meeting in 1999.88 The APT process has involved annual meetings of the members’ leaders (held 
during ASEAN’s Summits), and many meetings of ministers and senior officials in areas including 
politics and security, trade, labour, agriculture and forestry, tourism, energy and environment.  
The most significant element in APT activities so far has been the promotion of regional financial 
cooperation. From 1999 the group sponsored a proposal to increase financial communication and 
interaction among the East Asian economies through the ‘Chiang Mai Initiative’, which involves a 
series of ‘currency swap’ arrangements (initially on a bilateral basis) between the central banks of 
participating states. The arrangements provide the potential for regional countries to offer 
assistance to an ASEAN Plus Three member which faces financial difficulties and currency 
instability—without having to wait for action from the IMF or other authorities. The arrangements 
involve a surveillance mechanism so that the performance of the assisted country can be overseen 
by other regional states.89  
From 2010 the proposal was adapted into a multilateral form (now called the ‘Chiang Mai Initiative 
Multilateralisation’ or CMIM) and the total amount committed to the ‘currency swap’ arrangements 
is now over US$240 billion, although the amount available to any one member would be only a 
fraction of this total. The CMIM has been seen as a significant step towards further financial 
87. Richard Stubbs, ‘ASEAN Plus Three: emerging East Asian regionalism?’ Asian Survey, XLII, (3), May–June 2002, pp. 
441–448. 
88. Sanae Suzuki, ‘East Asian cooperation through conference diplomacy: institutional aspects of the ASEAN Plus Three 
framework’, APEC Studies Center, Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO, Tokyo, March 2004. 
89. Jennifer Amyx, ‘What motivates regional financial cooperation in East Asia today?’, Asia Pacific issues, East West 
Center, Hawaii, February 2005; Banyan, ‘A rather flimsy firewall’, The Economist, 7 April 2012; Reza Siregar and 
Akkharaphol Chabchitrchaidol, Enhancing the effectiveness of CMIM and AMRO: selected immediate challenges and 
tasks, ADBI Working Paper Series, no. 403, Asian Development Bank Institute, 17 January 2013, accessed May 2013.  
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cooperation in East Asia but its potential has yet to be clarified. The CMIM has not so far been 
utilised in any crisis and it is not clear whether the scale of the funds available would make it a viable 
supplement or alternative to existing institutions such as the IMF.90  
The ASEAN Plus Three grouping has become a significant focus for regional dialogue although much 
of its activities have in fact been on the basis of ASEAN interactions with each of the three Northeast 
Asian members individually rather than through cooperation among all thirteen members.91 The APT 
process has also stimulated exploration of additional avenues for further East Asian cooperation—
which led in turn to proposals for an ‘East Asia Summit’ of regional heads of government. 
The East Asia Summit  
The idea for an East Asia Summit (EAS) arose from discussions within ASEAN Plus Three about the 
desirability of a regular East Asian regional leadership gathering and was raised in a report which 
that grouping commissioned from the ‘East Asia Study Group’ in 2002.92 On the issue of possible 
participation, ASEAN, as the convenor of the first EAS, made it clear that Summit participants had to 
be signatories of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (or be prepared to sign it), needed to be full 
ASEAN Dialogue Partners, and had to have substantial relations with ASEAN.  
The ongoing political sensitivities among the major powers involved in East Asia cooperation soon 
became evident, particularly because of the competing interests of China and Japan. China was 
initially enthusiastic about the Summit proposal and argued that it should most appropriately be 
based on the thirteen member countries of ASEAN Plus Three. However it was evident that some 
other states were reserved about the prospect of a Summit based solely on the APT membership, 
since this could be seen to be possibly open to a high level of influence from China. Japan, with the 
support of a number of the members of ASEAN, argued that some other relevant countries, in 
particular India and Australia, should be invited to join the new forum. China continued to argue 
against this proposal into the early months of 2005, but most ASEAN members supported the 
Japanese position. It was ultimately resolved that India, Australia and New Zealand would be invited 
as inaugural members of the new Summit.93 
The initial Summits have been cautious attempts to develop dialogue and bases for consensus. The 
first East Asia Summit on 14 December 2005 was relatively short (at three hours) and few specific 
decisions were made. The emphasis was on developing communication among the members. The 
leaders’ statement issued by the Summit (the ‘Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the East Asia Summit’) 
affirmed that the EAS is intended to be an ‘open, inclusive, transparent and outward-looking forum, 
in which we strive to strengthen global norms and universally recognised values, with ASEAN as the 
driving force working in partnership with other participants of the East Asia Summit’. The Summit 
90.  Ibid.  
91.  John Ravenhill, ‘The “new East Asian regionalism”: a political domino effect’, Review of International Political 
Economy, 20, February 2010, pp. 1–31. 
92.  ‘Final Report of the East Asia Study Group’, ASEAN + 3 Summit, 4 November 2002, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, accessed 
30 July 2013.  
93. Ibid., pp. 2–4. 
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would be ‘convened regularly’, hosted and chaired by an ASEAN member and held ‘back to back with 
the annual ASEAN Summit’. 94 
The EAS has since proceeded cautiously as a venue for expanding dialogue and building 
communication and confidence. Since 2007, the Summit has been assisted by a research body, the 
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, (ERIA). ERIA, a primarily Japanese-backed 
think tank, was launched in May 2008. ERIA is a policy making and training forum and is also involved 
in infrastructure planning and the development of further plans for regional economic integration.95 
The EAS, however, does not have its own secretariat but is supported administratively by the ASEAN 
Secretariat (whose overall resources are limited, see below).  
The profile of the EAS has been raised by the addition of the US and Russia as members in 2010, with 
President Obama attending the Summits in 2011 and 2012. The EAS is sponsoring a wide range of 
cooperation projects as the meeting in Phnom Penh in November 2012 indicated.96 The Summit has 
been valuable as a venue for dialogue and the building up of communication among the leaders but 
it is still a work in progress. It is not yet evident if and when the major powers will be willing to use 
the Summit as a venue for substantive cooperation on key political and security issues about which 
they have major differences.97 
ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus Eight 
ASEAN’s latest security forum initiative is the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus Eight (widely 
referred to as ‘ADMM Plus’). This forum evolved out of the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meetings, 
which have been held seven times since 2006. The ADMM Plus brings together the defence ministers 
from the same eighteen countries who are members of the EAS. ASEAN sees the ADMM Plus as an 
additional way to engage dialogue partners in discussion on defence and security issues. The 
grouping met for the first time in Hanoi in October 2010: the second meeting was held in Brunei in 
August 2013 and ADMM Plus will convene every two years.98  
The first ADMM Plus meeting agreed to pursue dialogue in five areas: maritime security, counter-
terrorism, disaster management, peacekeeping operations and military medicine. To facilitate 
cooperation in these areas, five Expert Working Groups were set up, each one chaired by an ASEAN 
member and one of the ‘plus’ countries. These arrangements were reviewed at the second ADMM 
Plus meeting, held in Brunei in August 2013 and the chairmanships were reassigned: Australia was 
appointed along with Singapore as the chair of the Expert Working Group on Counter-Terrorism.   
The Brunei meeting also agreed that the ADMM Plus Eight would now convene every two years.  The 
94. ‘Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the East Asia Summit’, Kuala Lumpur, 14 December 2005, accessed 14 July 2013. 
95. ‘Japan/Asia: ERIA adds weight to Tokyo’s Asia push’, Oxford Analytica, 24 April 2008; for details of ERIA’s research see 
its website here.  
96.  ‘Chairman’s statement of the 7th East Asia Summit (EAS), 20 November 2012, Phnom Penh, Cambodia’, accessed 26 
July 2013. 
97.  David Camroux, ‘The East Asia Summit: pan-Asian multilateralism rather than intra-Asian regionalism’, in Mark 
Beeson and Richard Stubbs, eds, Routledge handbook of Asian regionalism, Routledge, London, 2012, pp. 375–383. 
98.  ASEAN Secretariat, ‘ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM)’, accessed 12 May 2013. 
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most high-profile activity of the ADMM Plus process so far has been the joint exercise on 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and military medicine, held in Brunei in June 2013.   The 
exercise brought together over 3,000 military personnel and was considered to have been an 
unusual opportunity for the participant forces to work together: the US Secretary for Defense Chuck 
Hagel described the exercise as a ‘major accomplishment’.   Further joint exercises are to be held.99 
The ADMM Plus is likely to proceed at a gradual pace; since the agenda needs to be approved by all 
members, it is not likely that highly sensitive security issues will be addressed explicitly. While it is at 
an early stage, the new forum has been seen as valuable in increasing regular communication among 
senior defence leaders and as a further way of sponsoring discussions at senior official level.100  
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 
ASEAN’s most recent major institutional cooperation initiative has been the proposal for a Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), announced by ASEAN leaders during the 19th ASEAN 
Summit in November 2011. The RCEP is a regional free trade agreement designed to include the ten 
ASEAN members along with the countries which currently have free trade agreements with ASEAN; 
Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand. The RCEP’s vision is to be a high-quality 
and mutually beneficial economic partnership agreement that will broaden and deepen current FTA 
arrangements. The RCEP concept grew out of two previous proposals for regional trade agreements 
based around the thirteen ASEAN Plus Three members and also the original sixteen members of the 
EAS (that is, the membership before the US and Russia joined). These two proposals have now been 
superseded by RCEP. The RCEP is intended to cover trade in goods and in services, investment and 
technical cooperation, intellectual property, competition, and dispute settlement. By rationalising 
the existing pattern of multiple free trade agreements maintained by ASEAN with the six partners 
noted above, the RCEP could reduce the complexity of what is often called the ‘noodle bowl’ effect 
of multiple sets of rules set by different trade agreements operating in parallel. As an ASEAN 
process, the RCEP will be guided by the ‘ASEAN Way’ of consensus. It is also likely to seek to 
accommodate the varying levels of economic development of the participants.101 
ASEAN hopes to secure agreement on RCEP by the end of 2015. Negotiations, however, are likely to 
be challenging. In the area of intellectual property protection for example, some of the participants 
in RCEP have significant differences in emphasis, with some countries (such as Japan and Singapore) 
concerned to maximise the protection arrangements for such property, and others (such as India 
99  Michito Tsuruoka, ‘An era of the ADMM Plus? Unique achievements and challenges’, PacNet Newsletter, Pacific 
Forum Hawaii, no. 69, 5 September 2013. 
100.  Ron Huisken, ’ADMM Plus cooperates in defence and security issues’, East Asia Forum, 19 October 2010, accessed 
13 May 2013. 
101.  Sanchita Basu Das, ‘RCEP and TPP: comparisons and concerns’, ISEAS Perspective, 7 January 2013, accessed 3 July 
2013. 
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and Indonesia) concerned about access to intellectual property, for example in the area of 
production of ‘generic’ pharmaceutical products.102 
RCEP is being pursued in the context of yet another multilateral initiative, the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP).103 The TPP originated in a proposal by Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore 
in 2003. The United States joined the process in 2008 and it has been emphasised strongly by the 
Obama administration. The participant negotiators now include twelve countries.104 The TPP is a 
more demanding proposal than the RCEP, having the aim of establishing a ‘gold standard’ agreement 
suited to the 21st century. Its provisions include emphasis on intellectual property rights, labour 
standards, competition policy, investment rules, environment standards and the role of state owned 
enterprises.105  
The two proposals are being pursued in parallel and they could both contribute towards the overall 
goal of liberalising trade and economic interactions across the Asia-Pacific region. However, there is 
some concern that the proposals could also be associated with patterns of major power 
competition, especially between the US and China. While the United States is a key participant in 
and proponent of the TPP negotiations, China is not currently a part of the process.106 China is a 
participant in RCEP but the US, which does not have a free trade agreement with ASEAN, is not. 
Sanchita Basu Das (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies) has commented: 
There is some concern about competition between TPP and RCEP, since the regional pacts have 
similar objectives over trade liberalisation and economic integration. These two agreements may 
also come into direct conflict due to the rivalry between the US and China, as each of these 
powers seeks to shape economic cooperation in the Asian region and cement their economic 
interests. Besides, any competition between these two agreements may lead to disunity within 
ASEAN, which may undermine the organisation’s centrality in the region. While Brunei, 
Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam are members of both RCEP and TPP, the rest of ASEAN 
countries are currently members of only RCEP.107 
ASEAN, the major powers and regional competition 
ASEAN’s efforts to develop wider multilateral forums have been striking. Without these efforts it is 
likely that East Asia and the wider Asia Pacific regions would have far fewer opportunities for 
102.  Mathew Rimmer, ‘Trade war in the Pacific: ASEAN and the Trans Pacific Partnership’, The Conversation, 30 November 
2012, accessed 11 May 2013. 
103.  For a detailed study of the TPP see Ian F. Ferguson, et al., ‘The Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations and issues for 
Congress’, Washington DC, Congressional Research Service, 15 April 2013. 
104.  Current TPP negotiation participants are: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Peru, Singapore, the United States and Vietnam. 
105.  Ferguson, et al., op. cit. 
106.  It has been argued that China would at this stage find it difficult to adapt to some of the TPP’s obligations, for 
example in the areas of labour laws, the role of state owned enterprises and rules for intellectual property rights, see 
Sanchita Basu Das, ‘The Trans-Pacific Partnership as a tool to contain China: myth or reality?’, ISEAS Perspective, 17 
May 2013, accessed 30 July 2013.  
107.  Sanchita Basu Das, ‘RCEP and TPP: comparisons and concerns’, op. cit., p. 7. 
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dialogue and the development of cooperation. ASEAN’s attempts, however, continue to face 
substantial challenges and obstacles. Three key and inter-related issues are the lack of widespread 
agreement on what is the most appropriate and acceptable grouping of ‘regional states’ on which to 
develop cooperative arrangements, the ongoing tensions and conflicting interests among the major 
powers, and the question of whether ASEAN can maintain effective cohesion as a cooperative 
institution, which is able to influence these dialogues’ agendas and directions and thus continue to 
claim a position of ‘centrality’ at the hub of regional cooperation efforts. 
There are differing views in Southeast Asia and more widely on what is the most appropriate 
‘regional identity’ as a basis for long-term cooperation. One strand of thinking has focused on the 
desirability of pursuing a distinctly ‘East Asian’ concept of cooperation, which would encompass only 
states from that region. In Southeast Asia this approach has been identified with former Prime 
Minister Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia, but there has been considerable interest in and support 
for this approach, including from China. A second strand of thinking has stressed the desirability of 
gathering together regional East Asian states with the other major powers which have high levels of 
interest in East Asia, including the United States and also India. This approach has been favoured by 
the US itself as well as by Japan and ASEAN members including Indonesia and Singapore. Given the 
diversity of the states in East Asia and their openness to the international economy, it is not 
surprising that different visions have developed alongside each other.108 
ASEAN has sought to adapt to this pluralism in approaches by sponsoring multiple groupings with 
sometimes differing memberships. The ASEAN Plus Three group, with a defined membership of 
thirteen states, is a reflection of ongoing interest in ‘East Asian’ focused basis for cooperation. The 
East Asia Summit, which originated from discussions within ASEAN Plus Three, represents views held 
simultaneously by many states that it is also desirable to explicitly foster dialogue among both East 
Asian states and states beyond the immediate East Asia region which have extensive interactions 
and interests with it. This dialogue thus brings together the thirteen ‘East Asian’ states with the US, 
India, Russia, Australia and New Zealand. So far, the two groupings are proceeding in parallel but this 
pluralism adds to the complexity of ASEAN’s challenges in trying to sponsor cooperation that can 
have distinct identities and utility for the participants.109 
Pluralism and potential competition are also evident in the area of trade cooperation strategies, as 
has been noted above. RCEP and the TPP are proceeding in parallel and could make a 
complementary contribution to trade liberalisation. However, they could also come to be seen as 
reflections of competition, particularly between the US and China. If that kind of competition were 
to predominate, then it could add extra pressures for ASEAN, whose members could be ‘pulled’ in 
different directions in trade cooperation.110 
108.  Camroux, op. cit. 
109.  Ibid; Takashi Terada, ‘ASEAN Plus Three: becoming more like a normal regionalism?’, in Mark Beeson and Richard 
Stubbs, eds, Routledge handbook of Asian regionalism, Routledge, London, 2012, pp. 364–374. 
110.  Sanchita Basu Das, ‘RCEP and TPP: comparisons and concerns’, op. cit., p. 7. 
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A second and related key issue is the climate of relationships among the major powers and how this 
will evolve. There is an ongoing pattern of contest and competition among the major powers with 
interests in East Asia. This is clearly evident in the relations among the three most important of these 
powers, the US, China and Japan, where there has been both cooperation and significant tensions, 
especially between the US and China, and China and Japan. Multilateral forums can provide valuable 
venues for building additional communication, alongside bilateral relations. However, without a 
greater degree of strategic accord among the major powers, the potential for substantive 
cooperation in multilateral forums is likely to remain limited.111 
A third issue is ASEAN’s capacity to maintain cohesion as a cooperative group. This partly depends 
on the success of its own integration programs. It also depends on whether the ASEAN members can 
withstand the pressures which can arise from ongoing and possibly intensifying competition 
between the major powers, particularly the US and China. ASEAN has been able to claim a central 
place in regional cooperation because no one major power has been in a position to lead and the 
tense climate of major power relations has enabled ASEAN to operate effectively in such a role. 
However, severe major power competition could damage ASEAN’s capacities for cohesion and room 
for manoeuvre in this regard. Donald Emmerson (Stanford University) has summed up this issue in a 
concise manner:  
If Sino-American rivalry escalates, ASEAN’s members could split into China-deferring and China-
defying camps, ruining the group’s ability to lead. In contrast, a peaceful balancing of power 
between Beijing and Washington could refurbish space for ASEAN to operate independently 
between the two.112 
Recent developments in relation to the South China Sea have shown how significant these 
challenges can be for ASEAN, and these are considered in the next section below. 
III: ASEAN—current issues and challenges  
In pursuing its strategies for cooperation, ASEAN is currently facing a number of significant issues. 
This section will outline four recent ongoing issues and challenges: territorial disputes and the South 
China Sea; the process of change in Myanmar; ASEAN’s own institutional capacities; and the 
question of whether ASEAN may wish to accept a new member in Timor-Leste.  
Territorial conflicts and the South China Sea 
Bilateral territorial disputes 
The pattern of serious inter-state conflicts in Southeast Asia in the mid-1960s was a principal reason 
for the establishment of ASEAN. Territorial disputes continue to be a major problem for the 
111.  William T. Tow, ‘Great powers and multilateralism: the politics of security architecture in East Asia’, in Ralf Emmers, 
ed., ASEAN and the institutionalization of Southeast Asia, Routledge, London, 2012, pp. 155–167. 
112.  Emmerson, ‘Challenging ASEAN: the US pivot through Southeast Asian eyes’, op. cit. 
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Association.113 A number of ASEAN members have in recent years had disputes with neighbours over 
ambiguous or contested borders. In some cases, states have been willing to submit conflicting claims 
to arbitration. Malaysia and Indonesia referred a dispute over Ligitan and Sipidan, two small islands 
off the coast of Sabah, to the International Court of Justice (ICJ; the matter was resolved in 
Malaysia’s favour). In disputes over islands in the Singapore Straits referred to the ICJ by Singapore 
and Malaysia, the Court ruled in favour of Malaysia in relation to Middle Rock and in favour of 
Singapore over Pedra Branca. It was notable in these cases that the states concerned relied on an 
international institution rather than seeking any form of adjudication through ASEAN.114  
Other bilateral disputes have been less readily resolved. Competing claims by Indonesia and 
Malaysia to the Ambalat offshore oil block in the Sulawesi Sea resulted in the deployment of military 
units by both countries to the area in 2005; moves which risked an armed clash. Disputation 
continued in 2009, with Indonesia sending several naval vessels to the area to ward off any incursion 
by Malaysian units.115 
The two most serious recent bilateral disputes have involved Cambodia and Thailand and the 
Philippines and Malaysia. A longstanding conflict between Cambodia and Thailand over an ancient 
temple at Preah Vihear and areas of land surrounding it have sparked armed conflict on several 
occasions in recent years. Between 2008 and 2010 several clashes resulted in the deaths of at least 
twelve Thai and Khmer soldiers. Further serious clashes occurred in February 2011 resulting in more 
deaths and the displacement of thousands of civilians near the contested areas. The dispute 
produced efforts by Indonesia, ASEAN’s Chair in 2011, to mediate, but resistance from the Thai 
military blocked the proposed deployment of unarmed monitors. After a change of government in 
Thailand in July 2011, tensions eased but the dispute had been a serious breach of the ASEAN values 
of peaceful resolution of disputes.116 The dispute is currently being considered by the ICJ; depending 
on the outcome of these hearings, further discord between the two countries is quite possible.117 
A further dispute arose in early 2013 in relation to the Malaysian state of Sabah. The status of Sabah 
was contested in the 1960s when Britain moved to incorporate the territory, along with Sarawak, 
into the new Federation of Malaysia. The Philippines Government made a formal claim to Sabah in 
1962 on the grounds that it had traditionally been under the authority of the Sultan of Sulu, but the 
territory became part of Malaysia in 1963. Diplomatic relations between Kuala Lumpur and Manila 
were for a time terminated. After 1969 the Philippines suspended but did not disavow its claim.  
113.  For a valuable assessment of territorial issues and disputes in Southeast Asia see Barry Wain, ‘Latent danger: 
boundary disputes and border issues in Southeast Asia’, in Daljit Singh and Pushpa Thambipillai, eds, Southeast Asian 
Affairs 2012, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2012, pp. 38–60. 
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The issue aroused controversy again in February 2013 when followers of a claimant to the Sultanate 
of Sulu launched an armed incursion into Sabah (the incursion was not supported by the Philippines 
Government). After attempts at negotiation failed, Malaysian forces attempted to expel the armed 
group and the fighting resulted in the loss of at least seventy lives.118 The ongoing sensitivity of the 
issue was highlighted by the fact that in March 2013 the Philippines Government reissued a 2008 
official circular which prohibited any representative of the government from giving recognition to 
any foreign state’s sovereignty over Sabah.119 Tensions over the issue had abated by mid-2013, but 
the dispute showed again how the legacies of history and of contested state boundaries continue to 
challenge inter-state stability and peace among ASEAN members.120 
The South China Sea: contending claims 
The most serious problem in relation to territorial boundaries confronting ASEAN and its members is 
in relation to the South China Sea. Six littoral states and governments have claims to areas of the Sea 
and tensions over these claims have risen in the past four years. Issues in relation to the South China 
Sea have also increasingly become part of the contest for influence among the major powers, 
notably between China and the US. In the ongoing contests over rights and sovereignty, ASEAN’s 
own cohesion has come under major challenge. 
The disputes in the South China Sea involve both claims to territorial sovereignty and to maritime 
rights, including the navigation rights of military vessels. In the South China Sea the territorial 
sovereignty status of two groups of islands and reefs is the major focus of disagreement. The Paracel 
Islands are claimed by China and by Taiwan (the Republic of China), and Vietnam. China controlled 
part of the Paracel chain from the 1950s and seized full control in 1974 when it expelled forces of 
the former Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). The second group, the Spratly Islands, consist of 
about 230 features including several small islands, coral reefs and shoals. According to a recent 
assessment by M. Taylor Fravel (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Vietnam, China and Taiwan 
claim sovereignty over all of the Spratlys, the Philippines claims fifty-three features while Malaysia 
claims twelve. Taiwan was the first government to occupy one of the Spratly islands (the largest such 
island, Taiping or Itu Aba, in 1956) and other claimants began to establish a presence from the early 
1970s. Vietnam now occupies twenty seven of the features, the Philippines eight, China seven, 
Malaysia five and Taiwan one. Littoral states also claim maritime jurisdiction over areas of the Sea, 
which under the UN Law of the Sea can give them rights to fish, mineral and petroleum resources. 
Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam claim maritime rights from their coasts. China (and 
Taiwan) also claim maritime rights on the basis of features in the Paracels and Spratlys.121  
118.  Richard Javad Heydarian, ‘Sabah crisis sends wider ripples’, Asia Times online, 29 March 2013, accessed 29 March 
2013. 
119.  ‘Philippines renews claim to Sabah’, Asia Sentinel, 27 March 2013, accessed 30 March 2013.  
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121.  M. Taylor Fravel, ‘Growing competition in the South China Sea’, in Michael A. McDevitt, M. Taylor Fravel and Lewis 
Stern, ‘The long littoral project: South China Sea: a maritime perspective on Indo-Pacific security’, CNA Strategic 
Studies, 26 March 2013, pp. 38–41, accessed 29 March 2013. 
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Considerable ambiguity surrounds some of the claims in the South China Sea.122 One issue is that it is 
not clear how many of the above water ‘features’ in the Sea would qualify under the Law of the Sea 
as entities which would justify claims to maritime rights. There is also a lack of clarity over competing 
claims. China, for instance, has claimed large areas of the South China Sea as falling within a ‘nine 
dash line’ (see map at the beginning of this paper). However, China has not so far specified exactly 
what its claims to sovereignty are within the area defined by the ‘nine dash line’. In relation to these 
claims, the International Crisis Group has noted that: ‘The uncertainty as to what China’s legal claims 
are, and apparent attempts to enforce sovereignty in areas that are too far away from its coasts to 
be part of its EEZ, has put it at odds with other claimants given that many of these areas are far 
closer to the coast lines of other claimants’.123 
The South China Sea has been a rich source of fish resources. Over five million tonnes of fish are 
harvested annually, which has constituted about 25 per cent of the protein requirements of the 
population of Southeast Asia.124 The Sea is also thought to have large reserves of minerals, oil and 
gas, although estimates of these resources have varied and a comprehensive assessment has not yet 
been carried out.125 Nonetheless, the existing and potential resources of the Sea have been a 
powerful additional source of motivation for the ongoing competition over sovereignty and maritime 
rights. 
Rising tensions 
The status of the South China Sea was a dormant issue for three decades after the end of World War 
Two. China took advantage of the weak position of the South Vietnamese (Republic of Vietnam) 
Government to seize full control over the Paracels in 1974. The growing competition for influence in 
the Spratlys resulted in a serious clash between Vietnamese and Chinese naval forces in March 1988, 
when 64 Vietnamese and six Chinese sailors were killed and two Vietnamese vessels were sunk. 
Further tensions arose when China seized control of Mischief Reef, an area in the Spratlys which had 
also been claimed by the Philippines and which was about 130 miles (209 km) from Philippines 
territory and thus well within that country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). For some years after 
1995 tensions in the area abated but have risen again since 2007. Several factors have contributed 
to the rise in disputation. 
One major factor in recent tensions has been diplomatic disputes associated with resource 
development. Most claimants to the South China Sea have interests in maximising their access to 
maritime resources including oil and gas (Brunei is already a very wealthy state through its own 
122.  For a useful recent survey of claims see Gregory B. Polling, ‘The South China Sea in focus: clarifying the limits of 
maritime disputes’, Report for the Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asian Studies, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, Washington DC, July 2013, accessed 26 July 2013.  
123  International Crisis Group, ‘Stirring up the South China Sea (I)’, Asia Report, no. 223, 23 April 2012, p. 2, accessed 29 
July 2013.  
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125.  See Will Rogers, ‘The role of natural resources in the South China Sea’, in Patrick M. Cronin et al., Cooperation from 
strength: the United States, China and the South China Sea, Center for a New American Security, Washington DC, 
9 January 2012, pp. 83–98. 
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petroleum resources). From the mid-2000s, Vietnam expanded efforts to develop offshore 
petroleum resources in areas it considered as coming within its legitimate EEZ. China issued a series 
of protests to the foreign oil companies involved in the searches as well as challenging Vietnam’s 
rights to sponsor and license such exploration. China’s pressure included threats to foreign oil 
companies that their future business interests in mainland China would be under question if they 
continued cooperation with Vietnam in exploration ventures.126 
In 2009 tensions were increased by the need for states with claims in the South China Sea to make 
submissions to a United Nations entity, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
(CLCS). The Commission reviews and can provide assessment of claims by states to extended 
continental shelf rights beyond 200 nautical miles. The deadline for submissions acted as a catalyst 
for claimant states to declare their interests in the area and to contest the claims of other parties. As 
M. Taylor Fravel has stated: 
Even though the May 2009 deadline for submission had been established ten years earlier, its 
impending arrival significantly increased the competition over maritime rights in the South China 
Sea … In addition, in the notes submitted to the commission, states not only contested each 
other’s claims to maritime rights but also their territorial sovereignty claims to the Paracels and 
the Spratlys. Finally, China’s first diplomatic note contesting Vietnam and Malaysia’s submissions 
included a map of the region that depicted the Paracel and Spratly Islands along with the nine-
dashed line. Although the Chinese note did not mention the line, Vietnam viewed the map as an 
expansion of China’s claims.127 
A second factor has been the pattern of major power competition for influence in East Asia. China, 
as has been noted, claims a large area of the South China Sea. As China’s economy has grown to 
reach the level of East Asia’s single largest (and the world’s second largest), its capacity to develop 
and deploy both non-military and military assets to assert its interests has grown substantially. China 
in recent years has increased the size and capacity of a number of maritime agencies which operate 
in the area. It has also enhanced its capacities for the exploration of resources, for example by 
unveiling a large offshore drilling unit. China’s defence spending has enabled it to pursue increased 
capabilities for military operations in the South China Sea. These have included additional surface 
ships and submarines, an aircraft carrier (purchased from the Ukraine, which is being prepared for 
service) and a major naval base on Hainan Island. China’s enhanced capacities have been 
accompanied by what have been regarded as more assertive actions in advancing its interests in the 
area. These have included restrictions on fishing by other states (including Vietnam), the 
authorisation of petroleum exploration in areas claimed by other states as falling within their 
respective Exclusive Economic Zones and the harassment of foreign vessels conducting seismic 
surveys or oil exploration. China’s actions in Scarborough Reef from April 2012 have been viewed in 
this context.128 
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The United States has also taken an increased interest in South China Sea issues. The US does not 
take any position on the contending claims to the Sea. However, it has affirmed its interests in the 
maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international law, freedom of navigation and 
unimpeded international commerce through the Sea. Since the Obama administration’s 
announcement of its ‘pivot’ (or ‘rebalance’) of US interests towards East Asia, the US has given 
increased emphasis to its relations with ASEAN and a key part of its recent policies has been a 
commitment to maintain and in some ways enhance US involvement in the ASEAN region, including 
through military deployments. In July 2010, the US increased its focus on the area when Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton, at the annual meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, indicated that the US was 
willing to facilitate multilateral discussions over the disputed territories in the Sea, stated that the US 
is opposed to coercion or threats of force in relation to the conflicting claims and reaffirmed the US’s 
commitment to freedom of navigation. The US has also moved to upgrade its security dialogues with 
some members of ASEAN, including the Philippines (which has included increased military aid) and 
Vietnam. However, while the US has affirmed the importance of international law, it has not yet 
itself ratified the UN Law of the Sea convention.129 
Japan is not a party to the disputes in the South China Sea but has recently had tense relations with 
China over the status of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea. Japan has moved to 
provide some diplomatic support to Southeast Asian states in their territorial disputes with China; it 
has also agreed to provide the Philippines with up to ten vessels for its Coast Guard and is expected 
to expand security dialogue and cooperation with Vietnam.130 China in turn has rejected the 
legitimacy of external powers’ interests in relation to the South China Sea.131 
Other factors have also fuelled tensions. There have been patterns of increased nationalist 
sentiment in some claimant states which have been seen as potentially increasing pressures on 
governments to take ‘firm’ stands on territorial issues. In addition to China, other claimant states 
have moved to upgrade their defence capabilities. Vietnam is acquiring additional naval vessels 
including six submarines and improved command and control capacities, which will give it greater 
capacities beyond its coast line; the Philippines is also upgrading its forces, albeit from a modest 
base.132 
Overall, the tensions in relation to the South China Sea are not considered to have advanced to the 
levels which existed between 1988 and 1995, but the contests for influence are of substantial 
concern to regional states, and to ASEAN. 
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ASEAN’s responses and dilemmas 
The competing interests and tensions in relation to the South China Sea have been difficult issues for 
ASEAN. Four members of the Association are claimants in the area and Indonesia has also been 
affected by claims, but the other five members are not. ASEAN’s expansion in the 1990s to include 
ten states added to the complexities involved. As Ian Storey (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies) 
has observed, there has been significant diversity in the approaches of ASEAN members towards 
South China Sea issues: 
Lack of progress on the South China Sea is not only due to intransigence on China’s part, but also 
the lack of consensus within ASEAN on how to deal with the problem. This lack of consensus 
stems from differing national interests and their varied relationships with China. The ten 
members of ASEAN have differing interests in and positions on the South China Sea: Vietnam 
and the Philippines view the problem as a major national security concern; fellow claimants 
Malaysia and Brunei tend to downplay tensions; Indonesia and Singapore have both called on 
China to clarify its claims; the four non-claimants in mainland Southeast Asia – Thailand, 
Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos – do not perceive a direct stake in the dispute and in any case 
wish to avoid jeopardizing close economic and political links with China by taking positions 
inimical to China’s interests.133 
Over the past two decades, ASEAN has sought to pursue dialogue and reduce tensions in the area, 
but with limited success. One strand of activity was a series of ‘second track’ workshops which were 
hosted by Indonesia and funded for a number of years by Canada. They considered a range of issues 
and put forward proposals for conflict reduction and cooperation in areas which did not involve 
sovereignty claims.134 At the inter-governmental level (‘track one’), ASEAN’s first major statement on 
the issue was in 1992, after China had passed a ‘Law of the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone’ of 
the PRC. ASEAN’s ‘Declaration on the South China Sea’ called for restraint and urged the parties 
‘without prejudicing the sovereignty and jurisdiction of countries having direct interests in the area’ 
to explore greater cooperation in fields including navigation and the combatting of piracy and illicit 
drugs. The Declaration also called for all countries to respect the principles of ASEAN’s Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation to help establish a ‘code of international conduct’. China’s response was 
non-committal. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated that China ‘would shelve our differences for the 
time being’ and would consider ‘negotiations with the countries concerned when conditions are 
ripe’.135 When China subsequently occupied Mischief Reef in 1995, an action seemingly not in line 
with the spirit of the 1992 ASEAN Declaration, ASEAN jointly censured these actions.136 
ASEAN tried to develop its proposal for a formal code of conduct but did not secure China’s 
participation. ASEAN was also compromised by the fact that its own claimant members had 
overlapping claims in the South China Sea. In place of a formal code of conduct, ASEAN and China in 
133.  Ibid., p 10. 
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2002 signed a non-binding Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. The 
Declaration advocated measures including the development of confidence-building measures, the 
maintenance of freedom of navigation at sea and in the air, and the conduct of negotiations in 
regard to international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 
particular. The Declaration did not deal with sovereignty questions and did not attempt to establish 
any sanctions for breach of its terms. ASEAN subsequently had great difficulty in trying to move 
beyond this non-binding declaration. A key factor has been that as Christopher Roberts has written, 
‘… China has mustered the potential to splinter any sense of collective identity in ASEAN’s elite-level 
strategic identity’.137 An example of China’s capacity to assert its influence was in October 2009 
when China was able to keep the South China Sea off the formal agenda of the ASEAN Summit and 
ensured that the issue was barely discussed in the informal talks which also took place.138  
In July 2011, ASEAN and China did reach agreement on a further document; a set of ‘Guidelines for 
the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea’. The 
Guidelines opened the door for discussion on cooperation projects in areas such as search and 
rescue and marine conservation. However, the proposals do not appear to have gathered any 
momentum and none of the cooperative projects have yet been put in place.139 
ASEAN faced further challenges on these issues in 2012. Efforts continued in ASEAN to try to develop 
a binding code of conduct between ASEAN and China which could develop ‘rules of the road’ and 
prevent destabilising behaviour. By mid-2012 the members had agreed on a set of ‘proposed 
elements’ which could be the basis for a code of conduct. China had agreed in principle to discuss 
such a code with ASEAN in late 2011 but it changed its position in July 2012, when the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry announced that talks could begin only when conditions were ripe.140  
ASEAN then encountered an embarrassing problem at its annual Foreign Ministers Meeting, held in 
Phnom Penh in July 2012. Disagreement between Cambodia (the Chair of ASEAN in 2012), and other 
ASEAN members over whether discussions over the South China Sea should be recorded formally in 
the usual communique resulted in ASEAN’s failure to be able to issue such a communique, for the 
first time in the Association’s 45 year history.141 The controversy was heightened by perceptions that 
Cambodia had pursued these actions in the context of its very close relationship with China and that 
it had been willing to lend support to China’s interests.142 In the aftermath of the Foreign Ministers 
Meeting, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Marty Natalagawa sought to reaffirm a sense of ASEAN 
solidarity over core principles in relation to South China Sea issues by pursuing shuttle diplomacy to 
a number of ASEAN capitals on 18-19 July, and he subsequently obtained unanimous agreement 
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138.  Ibid. 
139.  Ian Storey, ‘Slipping away? A South China Sea Code of Conduct eludes diplomatic efforts’, Flashpoints, Center for a 
New American Security, Washington DC, 20 March 2013, accessed 13 May 2013. 
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among the ASEAN Foreign Ministers to a six point declaration. On 20 July, Cambodia, as the Chair of 
ASEAN, then issued a statement of the six points on behalf of all ASEAN Foreign Ministers which 
reaffirmed ASEAN’s  commitment to: full implementation of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of 
Parties; support for the Guidelines for Implementation of the Declaration; support for the early 
conclusion of a Code of Conduct; full respect for the universally recognised principles of 
international law including the 1982 UNCLOS; continued exercise of self-restraint and the non-use 
force by all parties; and peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with the universally recognised 
principles of international law including the 1982 UNCLOS.143  
At the ASEAN Summit in November 2012, also in Phnom Penh, further problems arose when 
Cambodia again tried to block discussion of South China Sea issues. The Cambodian Foreign Ministry 
issued a statement on 18 November 2012, immediately after the Summit, which said that ‘ASEAN 
leaders decided that they would not internationalize the South China Sea from now on’. Other 
ASEAN members disputed the Cambodian statement. An attempt by Cambodia to insert the ‘will not 
internationalize’ comment in the Chairman’s statement for the Summit (an attempt which was 
considered widely to have been made at China’s behest) was understood to have been rejected not 
only by the Philippines but also by Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam. The Chairman’s 
statement did not include the proposed phrase. It reaffirmed the value of the 2002 Declaration. It 
also ‘underscored the importance of exercising self-restraint by all parties concerned and not to 
undertake any activities which may complicate and escalate disputes and affect peace and stability, 
and to handle their differences in a constructive manner’. The statement did not explicitly mention 
the issue of a binding code of conduct.144 
An additional element of contention was added on 22 January 2013 when the Philippines announced 
that it was making a unilateral submission to the UN on the country’s overlapping jurisdictional 
claims with China in the South China Sea. This marked the first time that a Southeast Asian state had 
resorted to legal means to challenge China’s claims. The Philippines’ submission seeks to challenge 
China’s sovereign rights, including to all resources and navigational rights, within the maritime space 
encompassed within the ‘nine dash line’ which appears on China’s official maps. The submission 
alleges that China has interfered unlawfully with Philippines’ sovereign rights within its 200 nautical 
mile EEZ. The Philippines requests the UN to declare China’s claim based on its ‘nine dash line’ to be 
invalid and to call upon China to take steps in line with such a conclusion, including desisting from 
exploiting any living or non-living marine resources within the Philippines’ EEZ.145  
It will not be clear for some time what prospects the Philippines has in relation to the case and an 
outcome would not be expected for several years. The Philippines decision to make the submission 
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has been seen as reflecting its concern at recent Chinese actions and at ASEAN’s difficulties in 
responding to Chinese claims in the area. The impact of the decision is not yet clear. Ian Storey 
(Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), writing just after the Philippines submission was issued, 
commented in relation to ASEAN views that, ‘Although ASEAN members recognise that it is the 
Philippines’ sovereign right to pursue legal arbitration, there will be concerns that the submission 
will have negative repercussions for ASEAN-China relations’.146 
Immediate outlook  
At the time of writing (September 2013), prospects for progress in reducing tensions in relation to 
the South China Sea continued to be uncertain. The assumption of the Chairmanship of ASEAN by 
Brunei for 2013 opened the way for some additional diplomacy on the issues. Brunei is a wealthy 
state with wide diplomatic networks. At ASEAN’s first Summit for 2013, held in Brunei on 24–25 
April, Brunei called for lines of communication to be kept open between the parties and for the 
setting up of an emergency ‘hotline’ that could help avoid misunderstandings which could lead to 
clashes over maritime disputes. Brunei also indicated that it would assign a high priority to 
attempting to seek agreement between ASEAN and China on a Code of Conduct by October 2013, 
before the second scheduled ASEAN Summit for the year.147 
At the end of the April 2013 Summit, it was indicated that ASEAN and Chinese representatives would 
meet later in the year for discussions. It was expected that ASEAN and Chinese officials would hold a 
meeting in the latter part of 2013 of the Working Group on the Declaration on the Conduct of 
Parties in the South China Sea. The fact that China had agreed to discussions on South China Sea 
issues at a multilateral level has been seen as a positive step but the potential for progress remains 
unclear.148 At the annual series of ASEAN ministerial meetings, held in Brunei (at the end of June 
2013), ASEAN was able to avoid any repetition of the show of disunity in the previous year in 
Cambodia. In a potentially positive step, China affirmed its willingness to hold discussions with 
ASEAN officials on a code of conduct.149 
Senior officials of ASEAN and China met for three days of talks on South China Sea issues in Suzhou 
on 14-16 September 2013. The Chinese foreign ministry said in a statement on 16 September that 
‘All parties at the meeting … have agreed to gradually widen consensus and narrow divergences … 
and continue to steadily push forward the agendas on a code of conduct.’ A joint working group to 
carry out ‘concrete consultations’ on a code was to be established, but it was not clear what the 
likely timetable for its activities might be. While the talks were seen as a positive step, tensions 
between China and the Philippines continued over disputed territorial claims, with the latter arguing 
that China was seeking to consolidate its presence in the area of Scarborough Shoal by deploying a 
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series of concrete blocks that might be a prelude to the building of installations to support an 
enhanced presence in the area.150 The prospects for substantive discussion and cooperation 
therefore remained uncertain. 
While discussions continue, the potential dangers of tension and possible clashes of interests in the 
South China Sea are substantial. In early May, the death of a Taiwanese fisherman after a clash 
between a Philippines Government vessel and a Taiwanese fishing boat, in an area disputed 
between both parties, emphasised again the potential for incidents to occur which can easily raise 
tensions.151 Ian Storey commented in an assessment in June 2013 that, ‘… the South China Sea 
dispute has entered a new and perhaps more dangerous phase. While few observers predict a major 
conflict in the South China Sea, ongoing tensions continue to breed suspicions, worst case scenario 
thinking, arms build-ups and regional instability. The increasing frequency of incidents at sea raises 
the risk of an accidental clash at sea which could escalate into an unwanted diplomatic and military 
crisis…’152  
ASEAN and Myanmar 
ASEAN has consistently had a membership which is very diverse in political character. As has been 
noted above, a key purpose of the Association has been to enable countries with widely varying 
political systems to be able to find and maintain common ground in regional cooperation. While 
ASEAN has been substantially successful in accommodating diversity, the character and patterns of 
individual members’ political systems and the way in which member states pursue political 
management and respond to pressures for participation and change, can be of major relevance to 
ASEAN’s capacity for cooperation and for its international image. In this context, it may be 
suggested, the developments in Myanmar have been of particular significance for ASEAN as a 
regional grouping. Since the 2010 elections, the country has been undergoing a striking process of 
change. ASEAN has a major stake in the pattern of developments in the country, not least because 
Myanmar is due to be ASEAN’s Chair for the year 2014.  
For many years after the military assumed control in a 1962 coup, Myanmar (also widely referred to 
by its former name, Burma) remained in a condition of relative isolation, with poor standards of 
governance and economic management. Elections were held in 1990 and were won by the National 
League for Democracy (NLD) led by the charismatic Aung San Suu Kyi, but the military subsequently 
did not concede power and maintained its dominant position. When Myanmar was accepted into 
ASEAN in 1997, there were expectations within the Association that its regime might gradually 
pursue some political liberalisation and increase communication with its neighbours, and that 
China’s influence could be balanced with wider relations with Southeast Asia. ASEAN pursued a 
cautious policy of engagement with Myanmar but hopes for political liberalisation were not realised. 
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After the arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi in 2003, international criticism of the regime increased and this 
posed problems for ASEAN’s image overall. Myanmar was due to take up its first rotational turn as 
Chair of ASEAN in 2006 but there were concerns in ASEAN that major dialogue partners such as the 
US and the EU would be unwilling to take part in ASEAN meetings hosted in Myanmar because of 
their opposition to the regime’s policies. As a result, Myanmar was persuaded by its ASEAN partners 
to relinquish its right to be the Chair for that year.153 
In 2007 a low point was reached in ASEAN-Myanmar relations after the regime repressed 
demonstrations led by Buddhist monks amid substantial violence in which over seventy people were 
killed. ASEAN foreign ministers, meeting in New York in September 2007 while participating in UN 
sessions, made an unusually sharply critical statement in which they expressed their ‘revulsion’ at 
reports of the repression in the country.154 ASEAN’s concern and criticism had no obvious impact in 
the country and as the Myanmar analyst Moe Thuzar (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies) has 
observed, the military regime ‘… up to May 2008 showed no signs of relaxing its paranoia over oft-
repeated emphases on national security and stability above all other considerations’.155 ASEAN was 
able to expand communication with Myanmar after the country was struck by Cyclone Nargis in May 
2008, which left large areas devastated and took the lives of about 140,000 people. The regime was 
initially highly suspicious of external offers of aid, but ASEAN and its then Secretary-General Surin 
Pitsuwan were able to play a valuable liaison and coordinating role which facilitated Myanmar’s 
access to aid and relief support. 
The Myanmar regime had been proceeding with its own ‘road map to democracy’ since 2003 which 
it declared would lead to free and fair elections by 2010. A new constitution was introduced which 
contained provisions which seemed aimed at preserving a central role for the military. Elections 
were duly held in November 2010 but restrictions placed on the major opposition party, the National 
League for Democracy, and the continued house arrest of its leader Aung San Suu Kyi, led to 
considerable scepticism about how much change the elections would actually produce.156  
Liberalisation and reform 
In fact, the 2010 elections were followed by an unexpected and striking process of liberalisation. One 
week after the elections, Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest. Myanmar’s President 
Thein Sein then proceeded to sponsor a series of changes. The military’s former omnipresence in 
daily life was reduced sharply, controls over the media were eased and wide-ranging political 
expression became possible. The government began to hold regular consultations with Ms Suu Kyi, 
laws were adapted to allow demonstrations and enable workers to organise and strike, and 
substantial numbers of political prisoners were released. In a further notable move, the government 
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held a number of by-elections on 1 April 2012 for 43 seats in the national lower and upper houses of 
parliament and for two in provincial assemblies. In the elections, the NLD won a total of 43 of the 45 
seats contested and Aung San Suu Kyi was elected to the lower house.157 Reforms have also been 
pursued for the economy. A managed float for the currency was introduced, to supplant the former 
pattern of multiple exchange rates which discouraged investment and growth. Some reform has 
been pursued in the banking sector, engagement with international financial institutions has been 
active and additional foreign investment has been encouraged.158  
While the process of change so far has been very encouraging, substantial challenges continue. It 
will not be easy to pursue economic and social reforms when administrative resources are limited 
after decades of neglect and under-funding. While economic change has been very evident in urban 
areas, conditions for much of the rural poor have not yet begun to change significantly. Myanmar 
has many ethnic minorities and serious conflict has continued in some areas, for example in Kachin 
state. Further inter-ethnic strife occurred in Rakhine State from late May 2012 when there was 
serious violent conflict involving the minority Rohingya community (who are Muslims) and Buddhists 
in the area. A government inquiry estimated that 192 people died and tens of thousands were 
displaced.159  
Additional ethnic violence occurred in early 2013 between Muslims and the majority Buddhist 
communities in central Myanmar. In March, at least 43 people died and over 10,000 were displaced 
after riots in the town of Meikhtila near Mandalay. Further violence between Buddhists and Muslims 
occurred in May 2013 in Lashio in Shan state: the violence has been associated with the activities of 
radical Buddhist clergy, who have promoted discrimination against Muslims in Myanmar. The ethnic 
violence in Myanmar has aroused widespread concern both internationally and in Southeast Asia; 
there have been instances of tensions and some violence in both Indonesia and Malaysia, where 
there have been concerns that radical Muslims may attempt to exploit the problems in Myanmar to 
gain additional support.160  
Myanmar also faces major challenges in managing ongoing political change at the national level. 
National elections are planned for 2015 and the NLD is considered to be a leading contender, 
especially after its success in the April 2012 by-elections. Aung San Suu Kyi could also be a major 
contender to compete for the presidency, although changes to the Constitution would be required 
to enable her to be a candidate.161 It remains to be seen whether the military, which still remains 
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very powerful and continues to have a significant presence in the parliament, would be willing to 
relinquish power in the event of an opposition victory. 
Developments in Myanmar have major implications for ASEAN. The process of change so far has 
been welcomed widely in the ASEAN region. In November 2011, ASEAN leaders decided that 
Myanmar should assume the role of Chair of ASEAN for the year 2014. This will place Myanmar in a 
high profile position in regional affairs at a time when its complex processes of change are still 
underway. Pavin Chachavalpongpun (Kyoto University) has highlighted some of the key issues 
arising: 
2014 will be a crucial year for both Burma and ASEAN. For Burma, it comes in advance of general 
elections scheduled for 2015, just the third national elections since 1990 and the first since 
significant reforms began. Serving as ASEAN’s chair will give the regime in Naypyidaw much 
needed political legitimacy. The government will be responsible for organizing hundreds of 
ASEAN meetings during the period of its chairmanship, which will further expose Burma to the 
regional community, bring in more investment from ASEAN countries and their dialogue partners 
and allow the government to exercise its leadership by working closely with ASEAN to reaffirm 
the members’ obligations toward community building in 2015. 
The chairmanship of ASEAN, therefore, could become a fundamental factor in shaping Burma’s 
internal politics in favour of the ruling elite, to a certain extent even influencing the general 
election results the following year. As for ASEAN, Burma’s chairmanship had become inevitable, 
although it is still a risky gamble …162  
The process of change since 2010 has overall been a positive development for Myanmar and for 
ASEAN but it is still underway. Continuation of progress will clearly be an important issue for the 
Association.  
ASEAN’s institutional capacities 
Another significant current issue for ASEAN is the capacity of its administration to manage and 
oversee the complex range of cooperative tasks called for in the ASEAN Community project. As has 
been noted above, the ASEAN members did not seek to develop an extensive multilateral 
institutional structure anything like that of the European Union. ASEAN members’ resources were 
limited and members were not keen to devolve significant responsibilities to an administration. 
ASEAN did establish a Secretariat based in Jakarta, headed by a Secretary-General. The role of the 
Secretariat and the Secretary-General were reaffirmed in the ASEAN Charter of 2008 but discussion 
has continued on whether the Secretariat may need to be developed further. 
In its 2012 report on ASEAN, the Asian Development Bank commented: 
It is clear that Jakarta is not the Brussels of the East and the ASEAN Secretariat is not planning to 
emulate the European Commission. It is also quite evident that it is extremely difficult for ASEAN 
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countries to conduct effective regional cooperation and integration in the absence of structural 
reforms that drastically bolster the Secretariat’s position.163  
The ADB report estimated that in 2011, ASEAN’s Secretariat had a total of 207 professional staff, 
which included 74 openly recruited positions and 133 locally recruited staff members. The ADB 
stated that, ‘Today, although the Secretariat has a larger pool of resources than 10 years ago, the 
pool of professional staff and financial resources available to the Secretariat remain considerably 
shorter than the institution actually needs… And the salaries the Secretariat is paying to its staff are 
fairly below international standards to attract highly qualified professionals from the region’.164 
The Secretariat’s budget in 2011 was about US$15 million per year. External donors, including 
multilateral agencies and bilateral donors (particularly among ASEAN’s dialogue partners) provide an 
additional US$60 million to support ASEAN multilateral cooperation; a small amount of this (about 
US$3 million) goes directly to support the Secretariat. One significant issue about ASEAN’s own 
funding to the Secretariat is that it is provided on the basis of equal-sized contributions from the ten 
members; Laos thus pays the same amount as Singapore, despite their obvious differences in 
wealth. The equality in the size of contributions is in line with ASEAN’s longstanding emphasis on 
equal rights among its very diverse membership, but it has been seen as limiting the available 
funding from ASEAN for the Secretariat. The ADB report estimated that ASEAN would be likely to 
need increased funding for its Secretariat in the next phases of the Association’s development (it 
estimated an annual requirement for US$50 million by 2015 and US$200 million by 2030). The ADB 
therefore recommended that ASEAN explore ways of enabling greater funding to be provided in a 
manner more commensurate with each member’s capacity to pay. This would require a revision of 
ASEAN’s traditional reliance on equal level contributions (for example by asking members to 
contribute amounts to a fund which could support joint activities).165 The ADB argued that if ASEAN 
does not revise its funding arrangements, it will continue to be unduly reliant on external donors to 
support its activities, and its capacities to manage its complex range of cooperation projects could be 
inhibited.166 
The resource limitations of the Secretariat raise questions about ASEAN’s capacities to continue to 
make progress in its own cooperation agendas. Sanchita Basu Das and Termsak Chalempalanupap 
(Institute of Southeast Asian Studies) have written: 
The paradox of ASEAN is that while it has yet to accomplish most of its community-building 
goals, it has continued to embark on new and more ambitious initiatives without mobilizing 
adequate resources or strengthening its institutions. How long it can continue to do this is an 
open question.167  
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ASEAN has declared a commitment to review its organisational character and the Foreign Ministers 
in June 2013 stated that a High Level Task Force on Strengthening the ASEAN Secretariat and 
Reviewing the ASEAN Organs would commence work soon.168 The outcome of these discussions will 
be significant for ASEAN’s future capacities for cooperation. 
ASEAN, enlargement and Timor-Leste 
ASEAN’s membership has stood at ten since Cambodia joined in 1999. As a regional grouping with a 
high international profile, ASEAN has attracted interest from other neighbouring states. Given the 
challenges which ASEAN experienced after the phase of enlargement in the 1990s, particularly in 
relation to Myanmar, the Association has been cautious about considering any further increase in 
membership. The two states which have expressed the most interest in being members have been 
Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Timor-Leste. 
Papua New Guinea has a strong identification with Melanesia and the South Pacific but it also 
adjoins Indonesian provinces in western Papua. PNG leaders have viewed with interest the 
possibility of closer association with ASEAN. PNG gained observer status with ASEAN in 1976 and it is 
a signatory to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and a member of the ARF. Senior PNG leaders, 
including former Prime Minister Michael Somare, have expressed interest in membership of ASEAN 
and in 2009 Mr Somare made an approach to the Philippines’ President Gloria Arroyo to seek 
membership. ASEAN sentiments about possible PNG membership are understood to have been 
generally cool, partly because of the country’s development challenges, highly publicised rates of 
crime and violence and potential for political instability. While Indonesia has been reported to be 
sympathetic to PNG’s acceptance into ASEAN, the prospects for an ASEAN consensus on this do not 
at present appear to be strong.169 
Timor-Leste’s case for membership has been given somewhat greater attention but a consensus for 
this in the Association has also not yet emerged. Timor-Leste (East Timor) gained full independence 
in 2002 and its leaders declared their interest in joining ASEAN. The new state was recognised as an 
observer with ASEAN in 2002 and it joined the ASEAN Regional Forum in 2005. In 2007 Timor-Leste 
acceded to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, a prerequisite for membership in the 
Association. After several expressions of interest by its leaders, Timor-Leste submitted a formal 
request for membership to ASEAN in March 2011, during the tenure of Indonesia as Chair of 
ASEAN.170 
At the time of Timor-Leste’s application, Indonesia expressed strong support for membership for its 
neighbour. In an interview in April 2011, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Marty Natalagawa was 
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reported to have said that excluding Timor-Leste from ASEAN would be ‘economically unnatural’ and 
‘politically destabilizing’ in the long run.171 However there have been reservations within some 
ASEAN members, notably Singapore, as to whether Timor-Leste’s membership would be a desirable 
step at this stage. Timor-Leste is a functioning democracy and it has a profitable oil and gas sector. 
The country also has substantial problems of socio-economic development to address and it 
experienced significant internal political conflict in 2006. Concerns have been expressed about 
whether it would have the necessary technical and administrative capacities to handle the very large 
numbers of ASEAN meetings held each year and whether it could handle the demands and issues 
raised by the ASEAN Economic Community proposal.172 
Under the ASEAN Charter, a consensus is required for acceptance of a new member and the issue is 
still under consideration. In March 2013, during a visit to Jakarta by Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao, 
Indonesia reaffirmed its support for Timor-Leste’s ASEAN membership. Foreign Minister Natalagawa 
stated that, ‘Making Timor-Leste an ASEAN member is not merely a technical issue. It involves 
geopolitics. To Indonesia, Timor Leste is a Southeast Asian country. The region’s future would be 
unstable if it was not an ASEAN member’. Indonesia, he said, would continue to seek a consensus 
within ASEAN to enable Timor-Leste to join ASEAN.173  
It remains uncertain when the Association will develop the required unanimous agreement on this 
issue. Timor-Leste’s possible membership in ASEAN was discussed again at the time of ASEAN’s 
Summit in Brunei in April 2013. The Summit’s official statement said in part that ‘… we have agreed 
to explore the possibility of Timor-Leste’s participation in ASEAN activities within the context of its 
need for capacity building’.174 After the Summit, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Natalagawa said that 
the declaration was a ‘small but significant improvement’ for Timor-Leste in relation to its bid to join 
ASEAN.175 However, it is evident that a consensus for membership does not yet exist within the 
Association. ASEAN’s Secretary-General Le Luong Minh commented after the Summit that, ‘We’ve 
established a group to examine Timor-Leste’s application to become a member of ASEAN. However, 
it must be noted beforehand that Timor-Leste must implement all obligations to be considered an 
ASEAN member’.176 
IV: Australia and ASEAN 
Australia has had a multilateral relationship with ASEAN since April 1974. Since then, interactions 
have been advanced by successive governments.177 The early years of the relationship were 
dominated by discussions about trade and economic issues but dialogue on security matters became 
171.  Ibid.  
172.  Ibid. 
173.  Bagus BT Saragh, ‘Yudhoyono talks borders, ASEAN with Timor Leste’s Gusmao’, The Jakarta Globe, 21 March 2013. 
174.  ‘ASEAN considering Timor Leste bid for membership: Secretary-General’, The Jakarta Post, 30 April 2013. 
175.  Bagus BT Saragh, ‘RI brings Timor Leste a step closer to ASEAN membership’, The Jakarta Post, 27 April 2013. 
176.  ‘ASEAN considering Timor Leste bid for membership: Secretary-General’, The Jakarta Post, 30 April 2013. 
177.  For an outline of the development of Australia-ASEAN relations up to 2008 see Frank Frost, ASEAN’s regional 
cooperation and multilateral relations, op. cit., pp. 49–59. 
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increasingly important from the late 1970s. Australia in the 1980s had a substantial interest in the 
conflict over Cambodia and ultimately played a significant role in helping to develop avenues 
towards a peace process, which led to United Nations intervention (1991–1993), UN-conducted 
elections and the formation of a new government. After the end of the Cold War, Australia 
supported strongly ASEAN’s initiation of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994. From the mid-1990s, 
Australia pursued an interest in closer association with ASEAN in economic and trade cooperation 
although accord took some time to develop. Cooperation on security issues expanded with the 
ASEAN countries in the wake of terrorist attacks internationally and in Southeast Asia from 2001. 
From 2004 a phase of further substantial cooperation developed. Australia and ASEAN held a leaders 
summit to commemorate thirty years of the relationship in December 2004. Australia went on to 
sign ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in July 2005. This step paved the way for Australia to 
be accepted as a founding member of the East Asia Summit in December 2005. 
Australia has been a participant in ASEAN’s annual Post-Ministerial Conferences since 1979. These 
annual consultations at foreign minister level have been supplemented by meetings of officials 
particularly through the Australia-ASEAN Forum. The Australian Parliament also has a dialogue with 
ASEAN in which Senators and Members are able to have regular interactions with their counterparts 
in the annual meetings of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly.178 In a further important step, in 
2007, under the Howard government, the two sides signed a framework agreement, the ‘Joint 
Declaration on the ASEAN-Australia Comprehensive Partnership’. The then Minister for Foreign 
Affairs Mr Downer stated on 1 August that: ‘The Declaration reflects the breadth and maturity of the 
ASEAN-Australia relationship. It builds on the momentum of this relationship and provides a 
framework for our future engagement with ASEAN, covering political and security, economic, socio-
cultural and development cooperation’.179 Australia-ASEAN cooperation is continuing across a wide 
range of areas and the following section will outline major recent developments and priorities since 
2008. 
Developments since 2008 
Economic relations 
The ASEAN countries, with a total population of over 630 million people and a estimated combined 
GDP in 2012 of US$2.3 trillion, are important economic partners for Australia (see Appendix A). 
Australia’s total merchandise trade with ASEAN in 2011–12 was A$69,967 million, with exports at 
A$26,385 million and imports at A$43,582 million. This represented 13.9 per cent of Australia’s 
overall trade, an increase of 9.2 per cent over the previous year. Australia’s services trade with the 
ASEAN group was valued at over A$20 billion. The two-way investment relationship is valued at 
about A$120 billion.180 
178.  See the website of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly here.  
179.  Alexander Downer (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Signing of the Joint Declaration on the ASEAN-Australia 
Comprehensive Partnership, media release, 1 August 2007. 
180.  Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ASEAN 10: fact sheet, accessed 22 April 2013.  
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Education is a highly important element in the relationship and constitutes Australia’s largest 
services export to ASEAN. Australia is a leading provider of both on-shore and off-shore education to 
the ASEAN region, and approximately 104,000 students from the ASEAN countries were studying in 
Australia in 2011. Australia awarded 1,284 scholarships to citizens of ASEAN countries in 2011 under 
the Australia Awards scheme. There was a total of 614,327 enrolments by students from ASEAN 
countries in higher education in Australia in the decade from 2002 to 2012.181 People-to-people 
linkages are very extensive, with high levels of tourism and travel between Australia and ASEAN 
countries. 
Aid continues to be a significant element in both humanitarian assistance and in helping to build the 
skills, infrastructure and institutions which can support further growth. Australia’s bilateral Official 
Development Assistance to developing ASEAN members amounts to A$1.189 billion in 2013–14. One 
significant element of the aid program is the ASEAN-Australia Development Cooperation Program 
(AADCP). Under Phase Two of the AADCP, Australia is providing A$57 million in a seven year program 
(2008–2015) with the aim of helping ASEAN to realise its goal of achieving an ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC) by 2015.182  
The ASEAN-Australia Development Cooperation Program is directed towards helping ASEAN 
members achieve their goals of increased economic growth and integration: it is managed jointly 
with the ASEAN Secretariat and utilises ASEAN Secretariat systems. One major emphasis of the 
AADCP is providing support to assist the ASEAN Secretariat to improve its corporate planning, 
human resources management and monitoring and evaluation systems. It also funds some ASEAN 
technical specialists, who are helping to enhance economic project management skills and processes 
within the Secretariat. A second major emphasis is to support the implementation of the ASEAN 
Economic Community, including through facilitating economic research and policy advice in areas 
including the identification of obstacles to economic integration, addressing the needs of the less-
developed ASEAN members, studying economic policy strategies and supporting the ASEAN 
members’ capacities to implement the plans for the AEC.183 Highlights of the Program in the past 
year have included assistance to promote regional cooperation in tourism, further assistance to the 
Secretariat in the area of corporate development, and support for the first of an annual series of 
symposiums to advance awareness about the AEC, including in the private sector. The first such 
symposium (in Jakarta, 19 September 2012) brought together over 200 participants from the public 
and private sectors, academics, civil society organisations and the media.184 
The Australian Government has sought to enhance the prospects for trade with the ASEAN region 
through pursuit of both bilateral and multilateral agreements. Australia has bilateral free trade 
agreements with three ASEAN members; Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia. A further major step in 
181.  Bob Carr (Minister for Foreign Affairs),  Southeast Asia at the crossroads of the Asian Century, Fullerton Lecture, 
Singapore, speech, 9 July 2013, accessed 14 July 2013.  
182.  Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’, accessed 22 April 2013.  
183.  AusAID, ‘ASEAN-Australia Development Cooperation Program Phase II: working in partnership’, accessed 11 July 
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184.  AusAID, ‘AADCP II: highlights 2012–2013’, accessed 11 July 2013. 
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trade promotion has been the conclusion of a multilateral agreement between Australia and New 
Zealand and the ten ASEAN members. Consideration of an agreement which could link together the 
Australia and New Zealand ‘Closer Economic Relationship’ (CER) with ASEAN began in the early 
1990s but initial progress was slow. Initiatives from the ASEAN side in 2004 resulted in renewed 
efforts to develop an agreement. Substantial negotiations took place under the Howard Government 
and an agreement was inaugurated under the Rudd Government. 
On 28 August 2008, the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (AANZFTA) was 
introduced with enthusiastic statements by the twelve trade ministers involved. The joint ASEAN-
Australia-New Zealand statement said: 
The Ministers noted that the Agreement is an important milestone in the long-standing ASEAN-
CER comprehensive partnership. As a living document, the Agreement brings to a new height the 
level of cooperation and relationship between the governments of ASEAN, Australia and New 
Zealand as well as its peoples.185 
In an individual statement on the same day, Australia’s Minister for Trade Simon Crean said that 
Australia stood to gain considerably from the agreement across many sectors:  
We’ve locked in goods market access gains in a wide range of sectors including agriculture and 
industrial products. We’ve also secured a good outcome on services, which will create more 
certainty for exporters in sectors such as engineering, education and the financial sector. The 
agreement includes provisions providing greater certainty and transparency for Australian 
investors … Importantly, we’ve got a commitment from our negotiating partners to build on 
these outcomes into the future.186 
The Australian Government has identified several key elements in the Agreement which can benefit 
Australian traders: extensive tariff reductions and elimination commitments; regional rules of origin 
which can provide new opportunities for Australian exporters to tap into production networks in the 
region; the promotion of greater certainty for Australian service suppliers and investors including 
through enhanced protection for Australian investors in ASEAN countries; and the provision of a 
platform for ongoing economic engagement with ASEAN through a range of built-in agendas, 
economic cooperation projects and business outreach activities.187  
The AANZFTA came into force in January 2010. Its potential impact on trade differs according to the 
particular sectors being covered. The Agreement is considered to be most significant in the goods 
sector, since it is in this area that ASEAN has done the most work on regional integration. The 
Agreement’s impact on the non-goods sectors is likely to be more modest, partly because of the 
185.  ‘Joint Media Statement of the Thirteenth AEM-CER Consultations Singapore, 28 August 2008’, accessed 11 July 2013. 
186.  Simon Crean (Minister for Trade), Australia concludes Southeast Asia Trade deal, media release, 28 August 2008 
accessed 11 July 2013. 
187.  Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Overview and key outcomes of the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free 
Trade Agreement, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade speaking notes for presentation at Austrade’s ASEAN 
Now seminars, 15–30 October 2009’, accessed 22 April 2013; ’The ASEAN Australia New Zealand Free Trade 
Agreement: our overview and assessment’, Minter Ellison Lawyers, April 2009, accessed 22 April 2013. 
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limited extent of intra-ASEAN integration in these areas so far. The Agreement will also come into 
effect gradually, partly because some ASEAN members need time to adjust their domestic 
frameworks of laws and regulations and partly because some areas of liberalisation will not be 
implemented fully until at least 2020. It is thus difficult to assess the likely full long-term impact of 
the Agreement, but it has clearly marked a major advance in the institutional relationship between 
the parties.188 
Australia has continued its long-term support for ASEAN’s economic goals by participating in the new 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). In a joint statement on 20 November 2012 
(while in Phnom Penh for ASEAN-sponsored meetings), Prime Minister Gillard and Minister for Trade 
Craig Emerson, congratulated ASEAN on the initiative. They noted that the RCEP participating 
countries include nine of Australia’s top twelve trading partners and account for almost 60 per cent 
of Australia‘s two-way trade and 70 per cent of exports. Australia’s participation in RCEP ‘… delivers 
on the vision for Australia’s engagement with Asia set out in the Australia in the Asian Century White 
Paper’. Ms Gillard and Dr Emerson also noted that RCEP will complement Australia’s participation in 
bilateral trade agreements and in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations: ‘Australia’s 
participation in each of these negotiations will add momentum to the process of competitive trade 
liberalisation’.189 
In relation to economic interactions overall, a detailed review of the Australian relationship with 
Southeast Asia, prepared by a commission organised by Asialink (University of Melbourne), has 
identified a number of issues which have been obstacles to business interactions.190 The report 
concluded that in both Australia and the ASEAN region ‘… there was a lack of understanding, or even 
knowledge, of the AANZFTA’ and that further efforts were needed to publicise the Agreement. The 
Asialink report argued that Australian businesses often lack sufficient awareness of the ASEAN 
countries and region and that this has inhibited the pursuit of investment from Australia. The report 
stated that, ‘Despite Australia’s proximity to Southeast Asia, the Commission did not encounter a 
strong view in ASEAN that Australian business people at this stage “understand the ASEAN region” 
better than their European or American counterparts’.191 Australian business people, the report 
suggested, often see substantial impediments to investment in the ASEAN region, including 
administrative corruption, ‘… and concerns about legal issues, market regulations, and a difficult or 
confusing range of regularity differences in the insurance area’. Australian business people have 
concerns about the likely profitability of investments and about their capacity to withdraw funds 
when desired.192  
188.  Ibid. 
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The Asialink report, however, also pointed to promising areas for further trade and investment. 
Australia has substantial expertise and a competitive advantage in the area of logistics and 
Australian firms are already having success in this area. There are substantial potential opportunities 
in the field of energy security, which is a high priority for the ASEAN region. There are opportunities 
for further cooperation in the field of food security. Australian involvement and support is also very 
welcome in the area of infrastructure development. Australia is already providing support for 
infrastructure development through bilateral aid programs, and in 2010 Prime Minister Gillard 
announced a commitment of A$132 million for major infrastructure projects in mainland Southeast 
Asia. The Asialink report suggested that there is considerable scope for further Australian 
participation in infrastructure development through ‘public-private partnerships’. Australia is already 
cooperating in supporting developments in the Philippines in collaboration with the Asian 
Development Bank, the International Finance Corporation and the World Bank, with Australia 
providing A$15 million over three years. The report suggested that given the great need for 
infrastructure in a number of ASEAN countries (when only Singapore and Malaysia are considered to 
have adequately developed infrastructure) further Australian initiatives in these areas would be 
desirable.193 
Political dialogue 
Australia’s process of political dialogue has continued and been extended in the past six years in 
several major areas. In June 2008, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd visited the ASEAN Secretariat in 
Jakarta, the first head of government of an ASEAN dialogue partner to do so. During the visit (on 13 
June) he announced the inauguration of the second phase of the ASEAN-Australia Development 
Cooperation Program. In July 2008, the Minister for Foreign Affairs Stephen Smith announced that 
Australia would nominate an Ambassador to ASEAN. The ambassador would be a senior Canberra-
based diplomat whose duties would include participating in meetings at the ASEAN Secretariat and 
in other regional ASEAN meetings.194 
Another early initiative of the Rudd Government proved more contentious. In a speech in Sydney on 
4 June 2008, Prime Minister Rudd stated that it was desirable to review the long-term vision for the 
architecture for the Asia-Pacific region. He argued that this vision needed to embrace, ‘[a] regional 
institution which spans the entire Asia-Pacific region—including the United States, Japan, China, 
India, Indonesia and the other states of the region … which is able to engage in the full spectrum of 
dialogue, cooperation and action on economic and political matters and future challenges related to 
security’. Mr Rudd argued that, ‘At present none of our existing regional mechanisms as currently 
configured are capable of achieving these purposes’. He announced that he had appointed a former 
193.  Ibid., p. 22. 
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head of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Richard Woolcott, to explore attitudes and 
approaches towards the proposal.195 
The response to the proposal in the ASEAN region was cool.196 There was concern that there had 
been insufficient consultation with ASEAN members before the announcement was made and 
criticism that the initial proposal did not give sufficient emphasis to the role which ASEAN had played 
in sponsoring regional cooperation. Richard Woolcott conducted extensive consultations in a 
number of countries about the concept. He later reported that while there was considerable interest 
in considering the need to review regional cooperation arrangements, there was no appetite to 
develop a distinctly new institution.197  
The Australian Government continued to express an interest in exploring possibilities without 
seeking to present any fixed or final views on a destination. The government sponsored a conference 
of regional experts and officials in Sydney in December 2009 to review regional cooperation issues. 
While there was reported to have been considerable interest in wider and enhanced cooperation 
arrangements, there was also criticism, including by a prominent Singaporean delegate (Professor 
Tommy Koh), that a satisfactory consensus had not emerged.198 
In the period during which the Australian proposals were being discussed, other developments 
among interested parties, particularly in the United States, saw increased interest in the issue of 
participation in regional dialogues. From 2009, the Obama administration in the US expressed 
increased interest in ASEAN and ASEAN-sponsored regional forums, including the East Asia Summit. 
ASEAN decided to invite both the US and Russia to join the East Asia Summit and the decision was 
made formally in October 2010.  
In a speech on 8 December 2010, Mr Rudd (now Foreign Minister) expressed satisfaction at the 
expansion of the EAS. He stated that ‘This was our core objective in proposing the concept of an Asia 
Pacific community … a regional institution with sufficient membership and mandate, and meeting at 
summit level, to begin to carve out a rules-based order for the future. In October, with the EAS’ 
expansion, we achieved the core of that objective. The challenge now is to build this emerging 
institution’s agenda’.199 
Since 2010 Australia has continued to support the role of the expanded EAS and has sought to 
contribute to its emerging agenda. At the sixth EAS in November 2011, agreement was reached to 
endorse a joint proposal by Australia and Indonesia to strengthen regional responses to natural 
195.  Kevin Rudd (Prime Minister), Address to the Asia Society Australasia Centre, Sydney: it’s time to build an Asia-Pacific 
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disasters, working with other regional groupings. The then Foreign Minister Senator Carr 
commented in relation to this initiative that, ‘This is a major priority for our region, as well as an 
important area of potential soft security cooperation between the emergency services and the 
armed forces of the region.’200 
At the seventh EAS in Phnom Penh (20 November 2012), Prime Minister Julia Gillard announced 
additional cooperative measures. Australia will provide funding of A$50 million for the Australia-Asia 
Program to Combat Trafficking in Persons which aims to support victims of trafficking through the 
criminal justice program as well as helping investigators and prosecutors to increase convictions and 
reduce opportunities for trafficking. Australia made a further commitment in the area of public 
health by contributing to the establishment of an Asia-Pacific Leaders’ Malaria Alliance to enhance 
coordination and action in combatting the disease. This proposal was a recommendation  of the 
‘Malaria2012’ conference which had been hosted by Australia.201 
Foreign Minister Carr highlighted the potential long-term value of the EAS from the Australian 
Government’s point of view in an article in July 2012. He commented: 
It is fundamentally in all our interests that China and the United States are now together in the 
EAS along with the rest of the expanded EAS membership. One of the key advantages of the EAS 
is that it offers a venue for transparency and collaboration that, over time, can build confidence 
and trust, drawing on the spirit of cooperation that is already well-established in other ASEAN-
centred forums. The concept of common security is as much a habit as it is a concrete doctrine 
guiding specific actions. The habits of regular leaders-led dialogue on an agenda that includes 
security policy is itself inherently normalising … 
None of us are naïve about the capacity of the EAS to deal with all the challenges confronting its 
members. Yet, while there will be many testing times ahead, it is clear we have made a solid 
start on the broader regional agenda.202 
The EAS is still at an early stage, and while it was inaugurated in 2005, its current membership 
(including Russia and the US) only dates from 2011. In the future, Australia hopes to see the EAS 
develop further its identity and role as a leaders meeting. One way of promoting the Summit’s role 
might be to encourage more formal linkages between the EAS and the ADMM Plus process and the 
ASEAN Regional Forum, so that leaders in the Summit could consider ideas arising out of those 
forums’ discussions. The Summit’s utility could also be advanced with additional institutional 
support, and it may ultimately be possible to establish its own secretariat, either within the ASEAN 
Secretariat or separately. 
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Additional security dialogues and cooperation 
ASEAN-sponsored dialogues and forums provide a useful contribution to the wide patterns of 
Australian security interactions with Southeast Asia and East Asia. Australia’s role in regional security 
includes its participation since 1971 in the Five Power Defence Arrangements (along with Malaysia, 
Singapore, New Zealand and the United Kingdom) and extensive bilateral security dialogues with a 
number of ASEAN members. The Australian Defence Force takes part in multilateral military 
exercises (such as the US-sponsored Cobra Gold exercises) and has officer training programs with a 
number of regional states. Alongside these activities, Australia is also a founding member of the 
ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus process which (as noted above) brings together the defence 
ministers of the same eighteen countries who meet in the EAS. Australia took part in the inaugural 
meeting in Hanoi in October 2010 and is chairing with Malaysia the ‘ADMM Plus Maritime Security 
Experts Group’ which is examining areas of further multilateral maritime cooperation.203  
The then Minister for Defence Stephen Smith attended the second ADMM Plus meeting in Brunei on 
29 August 2013.  In comments made at the meeting, Mr Smith noted that, ‘By involving all members 
of the East Asia Summit, the ADMM-Plus strengthens and deepens trust and cooperation on defence 
and security matters throughout the Indo Pacific.’ Mr Smith praised the recent humanitarian 
assistance, disaster relief and military medicine exercise as a ‘significant demonstration of practical 
cooperation.’  He noted that the Experts Working Group on Maritime Security, chaired by Malaysia 
and Australia, had met five times, conducted a table-top exercise against non-traditional maritime 
security challenges and had ‘reached consensus on establishing further practical activities and ways 
to enhance information sharing between member countries.’ Mr Smith affirmed that Australia and 
Malaysia would co-host the inaugural field exercise in maritime security on 29 September–1 October 
2013 in Jervis Bay; fourteen members of the ADMM-Plus would participate, with twelve contributing 
ships for the exercise.  Australia would take up the role of Co-Chair of the Expert Working Group on 
Counter-Terrorism (with Singapore) and Mr Smith stated that, ‘Australia looks forward to the 
opportunity to continue building regional capacity, foster interoperability, build links and 
relationships and enhance information sharing.’204 
ASEAN dialogues can also facilitate Australian involvement in other areas of security cooperation, 
including efforts to combat terrorism and transnational crime. Since 2001 and 2002 (after 
‘September 11’ and the Bali bombings in October 2002) counter-terrorism has been a major area of 
cooperation for Australia and ASEAN. Much of this has been on a bilateral basis but Australia has 
also supported the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (an Australia-Indonesia bilateral 
initiative established in 2004) which has become a regional centre for law enforcement. In the area 
of police interactions and cooperation, Australia became a dialogue partner with ASEANAPOL (the 
Chiefs of ASEAN Police) in 2008 and senior Australian police officers have annual meetings with their 
203.  See Paper presented by Minister for Defence Stephen Smith MP to the ADMM Plus Maritime Security Experts’ 
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counterparts at the ASEAN Chiefs of Police Conference.205 These activities are largely out of the 
normal public arena but they are a further part of the networks of relations in the overall ASEAN 
relationship. 
Australia-ASEAN political dialogue: developments since 2010 
In political engagement with ASEAN since 2010, another milestone in interactions was reached on 30 
October 2010 with the holding of a further ASEAN-Australia Summit at leadership level. This was the 
third such heads of government summit between Australia and ASEAN, after those held in 1977 and 
2004. The meeting’s Joint Statement expressed ASEAN’s appreciation for Australia’s ‘steadfast 
friendship’ since 1974 and affirmed that, ‘ASEAN Leaders appreciated Australia’s continued support 
for ASEAN’s institutional strengthening through the implementation of the ASEAN Charter, and for 
ASEAN’s central role in the regional architecture in responding to regional and global challenges’.206 
The meeting reviewed and reaffirmed the wide areas of ongoing cooperation between the parties. 
Prime Minister Gillard also announced three new initiatives: an additional investment of assistance 
to the Greater Mekong Sub-Region ‘to assist in connecting the rural poor to new markets, including 
by upgrading, rehabilitating and maintaining roads, bridges and rail links in the region’; support for a 
new initiative with the International Labour Organisation to promote protection of migrant workers; 
and a commitment to assist the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights.207 
In an area of significant interest to ASEAN, Australia has given strong support to the process of 
change in Myanmar since the 2010 elections. The Australian Government has welcomed the process 
of reform pursued since the new government was inaugurated in March 2011. The then Minister for 
Foreign Affairs (Senator Carr) visited Myanmar on 5–8 June 2012 to assess what more Australia 
could do to support reform efforts. During the visit, Senator Carr announced that Australia would lift 
its autonomous travel and financial sanctions on Myanmar (a decision which took effect on 3 July 
2012) but an embargo on arms sales or transfers was maintained. Senator Carr also announced a 
doubling of Australia’s aid (to A$100 million) and further support for human rights promotion, peace 
building, and preservation of urban heritage.208  
Australia has also given support to ASEAN by pursuing a diplomatic effort to help persuade the 
European Union to lift permanently its sanctions on Myanmar. These activities have been reported 
to have included discussions with governments including the US, the UK, Canada, France, Germany 
and Holland. Greg Sheridan wrote in February 2013 that ‘Senator Carr’s activism has won strong 
support among ASEAN officials …’209 When the EU did lift its sanctions in April 2013 Senator Carr 
noted his satisfaction, while also stating that, ‘I remain concerned by religious and ethnic violence in 
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Myanmar and want the government to more effectively intervene to prevent it.’210 After a further 
visit to Myanmar, in early July 2013, Senator Carr reaffirmed his concerns about inter-ethnic conflict, 
particularly in relation to the Rohingya population in Rakhine State and warned that inter-ethnic 
violence could threaten the progress of economic and political reform. Senator Carr stated: 
I perceive the danger of Myanmar losing a lot of the lustre of their transition to democracy as a 
result of the sectarian tensions … and the widespread view that racial discrimination is allowed 
to be directed at a minority. There needs to be an authentic reconciliation across religious and 
ethnic divides.211  
On another issue of major interest to the ASEAN states, the South China Sea, Australia has 
maintained a cautious position. Foreign Minister Carr discussed the issue in a speech on August 
2012. Senator Carr noted that Australia does not take sides on the territorial disputes and that it 
calls on countries to pursue their territorial claims and accompanying maritime rights in accordance 
with international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Senator Carr went on to 
say that the South China Sea ‘… isn’t the only place where there have been complex and overlapping 
territorial and maritime claims’ and that to advance the issue, it may be desirable for states ‘to 
“agree to disagree” over who owns what and to focus on how all parties can benefit’. He suggested 
two models of how countries could successfully manage competing interests— the Antarctic Treaty 
had helped countries set aside sovereignty claims and concentrate on wide areas of cooperation, 
and joint development zones could also facilitate mutually beneficial development. Senator Carr 
stated that, ‘I’m not saying that joint development zones or the Antarctic Treaty-style system will 
provide all the answers in the South China Sea. But thinking creatively and constructively and 
examining models like these provide a path that deserves to be explored.’212 It is understood that 
the Australian government considers that ‘second track’ dialogues are a useful means to facilitate 
further discussions on these issues. In line with this approach, the Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute hosted a conference on maritime confidence –building measures in the South China Sea 
(with support from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) which was held in Sydney on 12–13 
August 2013.213 
Prime Minister Gillard reaffirmed the Government’s approach during her attendance at the EAS in 
November 2012. Ms Gillard said at a media conference on 20 November:  
Australia’s position is that we do not take sides on the territorial claims. We do not have a view 
about the territorial claims. But we do have a view that the South China Sea questions need to 
be worked through peacefully and in accordance with international law. And we are very 
supportive of the work of ASEAN and China to develop a code of conduct for the South China Sea 
210.  Bob Carr (Minister for Foreign Affairs), European Union lifts Myanmar sanctions, media release, 24 April 2013, 
accessed 27 April 2013. 
211.  Mark Baker, ‘Suu Kyi confirms tour of Australia’, The Sun-Herald, 14 July 2013. 
212.  Bob Carr (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Dr Lee Seng Tee, address at Australian National University, speech, 21 August 
2012, accessed 4 July 2013. 
213.  See Maritime confidence-building measures in the South China Sea conference, Special report, Australian Strategic 
Policy Institute, Canberra, September 2013, accessed 1 October 2013.   
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… [We] are talking about an area of the world that our shipping needs to go through to take our 
goods to the world. This is a very heavily used trade route for Australia and consequently what 
happens there in terms of maritime security is important to us.214 
On relations with ASEAN overall, the Government announced in October 2012 a further step 
towards institutional links in the ‘Australia in the Asian Century’ White Paper. Australia, the report 
stated, would establish a position of resident Ambassador to ASEAN.215 
Senator Carr gave further attention to the ASEAN relationship in an address to the National Press 
Club on 28 June 2013 on Australia’s foreign policy priorities. Senator Carr referred to Australia’s 
support for ASEAN on Myanmar and issues related to the lifting of sanctions; he went on to say:  
… I’ve said to ASEAN foreign ministers when I’ve met them in various forums: that’s an example 
of Australia moving its policy in alignment with the policy struck with the ten nations of ASEAN, 
that’s habits of consultation. And it’s an ingrained habit. And it means that you don’t lecture 
them. You don’t harass them. You speak to them, taking account of their concern for ASEAN 
centrality. And we’ve been doing that. But it’s something that will have a cumulative effect as we 
go on. And Myanmar is a good working example of an Australian policy settled on after 
consultation, and after recognition of what the ten nations of ASEAN were doing.216 
Enhancing relations 
As the previous discussion has indicated, Australia now has a very extensive relationship with ASEAN 
and interactions are proceeding in many simultaneous directions. Political communication has 
recently been enhanced by areas of joint cooperation and economic relations are expanding under 
the umbrella of the AANZFTA. The inauguration of the position of a resident Australian Ambassador 
to ASEAN will provide an additional focus for relations. On 5 July 2013, Prime Minister Rudd 
announced that Simon Merrifield had been nominated by the Australian Government to take up this 
position.217  On 18 September 2013, the incoming Minister for Foreign Affairs Julie Bishop 
announced the confirmation of Mr Merrifield’s appointment after his nomination had received 
approval from the ASEAN Foreign Ministers.218 
The Australia-ASEAN connection overall will be highlighted in 2014 when both sides mark the 40th 
anniversary of the multilateral relationship. A special commemorative leadership summit is being 
planned for October 2014 in Myanmar to mark the anniversary and to consider further ways to 
enhance relations. In a statement on 1 July 2013, the Philippines’ Secretary for Foreign Affairs Albert 
del Rosario said after talks with Australian representatives that the planned Commemorative 
Summit will be an opportunity to explore new strategic directions and cooperative agendas for the 
214.  ‘Prime Minister, transcript of joint press conference, Phnom Penh, 20 November 2012’, op. cit. 
215.  Australian Government, Australia in the Asian Century, White paper, October 2012, p. 257. 
216.  Bob Carr (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Australia’s foreign policy directions, National Press Club address, 28 June 
2013, accessed 4 July 2013. 
217.  Kevin Rudd (Prime Minister), Speech to business breakfast, speech, 5 July 2013, accessed 8 August 2013.  
218.  Julie Bishop (Minister for Foreign Affairs), First resident ASEAN Ambassador, media release, 18 September 2013, 
accessed 1 October 2013.   
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two sides. Secretary del Rosario said that as part of the commemorative celebrations in 2014, ASEAN 
and Australia will develop a Plan of Action for 2014–2018 that will bring in more opportunities to 
cooperate. The Plan is expected to be unveiled at the Commemorative Summit.219 It is understood 
that Australia would like to see the development of an annual Australia-ASEAN dialogue at 
leadership level and the potential for this will be explored further.  
In addition to these developments, there are clearly issues and areas which can be considered for 
the further enhancement of relations. In reference to the Australia-ASEAN relationship overall, a 
significant contribution to debate has been made by the Asialink Commission report, which has been 
noted and cited above. The report has proposed a number of areas in which Australian relationships 
with Southeast Asia, and with ASEAN in particular, could be enhanced and extended (for further 
details see the footnote below).220 The Asialink report suggested: 
• Australia should ‘give the ASEAN region a central place in the Australian international narrative, 
as a natural partner and neighbour.’  
• Australia should commit ‘credible and sustained resources to lifting Australia’s profile in 
Southeast Asian countries and the ASEAN region’s profile in Australia’. A ‘whole-of-government’ 
approach will benefit ASEAN cooperation. 
• Australia should seek to establish an annual ‘ASEAN plus one’ meeting at leadership level to 
deepen high level ties. 
• Australia should continue to work closely with ASEAN across the range of dialogues it takes part 
in with ASEAN. Consideration could be given to increasing assistance to the Economic Research 
Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) to help support its research and policy work on regional 
economic integration. 
• Increased efforts are desirable to explain more widely the opportunities available through the 
AANZFTA–within Australia and in the ASEAN region.  
• Increased support could be given to assist ASEAN in the development of the ASEAN Economic 
Community. 
• Australia should provide assistance where possible to help boost Australian investment in the 
ASEAN region. 
• Australia could become a partner in the Chiang Mai Initiative by committing funds and providing 
technical assistance. 
219.  Department of Foreign Affairs, ‘Republic of the Philippines‘ Secretary Del Rosario leads talks on new strategic 
directions in ASEAN-Australia relations’, Pasay City, 1 July 2013, accessed on 26 July 2013. 
220.  Milner and Percival-Wood, eds, ‘Our place in the Asian Century: Southeast Asia as “The Third Way” ’ op. cit., p. 6. 
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• The government could expand the Special Visitor Scheme, which has a proven record of 
effectiveness, and utilise ‘track two’ dialogues that can help advance relations. 
• Australia should also review and then revitalise both language and non-language teaching in 
relation to ASEAN countries. 
Australia–a possible future member of ASEAN? 
A further and speculative long-term question which received some discussion in 2012 is whether 
Australia might at some future point consider itself (and be considered) as a possible member of 
ASEAN. Given the obvious differences in economic structure and political systems between Australia 
and ASEAN members, this is not a question which has hitherto generally been seen as relevant. 
Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong of Singapore mentioned the possibility of Australia as a future ASEAN 
member during a visit to Singapore by Prime Minister Paul Keating in January 1996, but Mr Goh 
made it clear that he had been thinking in a very long-term manner and that there had been no 
proposal advanced, and no discussions held on the matter.221  
In 2012, several figures in Australia mentioned the concept of Australian membership as a 
possibility, including former Prime Minister Paul Keating and a former senior Australian ambassador 
with extensive regional experience, John McCarthy.222 Mr Keating stated in November 2012 that, 
‘This grouping represents the security architecture of south-east Asia, the one with which we can 
have real dialogue and add substance. In the longer run, we should be a member of it–formalising 
the trade, commercial and political interests we already share’. The long term potential of Australia 
to become an ASEAN member was also referred to in a presentation in Australia in August 2012 by 
the senior Singaporean analyst Kishore Mahbubani.223 
There are clearly many complexities and obstacles which would arise in any consideration of 
Australia as a possible member of ASEAN. Australia’s styles of economic development and 
governance differ substantially to those of ASEAN members and ASEAN is still struggling to pursue its 
own ASEAN Community program. Australia’s liberal political order and its pattern of public 
discussion and media reporting and comment are very different from those prevailing in the ASEAN 
region overall and attempting to move to membership might exacerbate differences rather than 
encouraging greater accord. Australia might also find difficulties in attempting to adapt to ASEAN’s 
styles of consensus-based decision-making. It can be argued that significant areas of Australia’s 
foreign policy activities in relation to Southeast Asia (such as its role in relation to the Cambodia 
peace process in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the transition in East Timor from 1999) would 
not have been possible if Australia had not been able to operate as a sympathetic but nonetheless 
221.  Goh Chok Tong (Prime Minister of Singapore) and Paul Keating (Prime Minister), 'Joint press conference at the 
Shangri La Hotel, Singapore, 17 January 1996: transcript', transcript, accessed 26 July 2013.  
222.  Paul Keating, ‘Forget the West, our future is to the North’; The Age, 15 November 2012; John McCarthy, ‘Let’s aim to 
be more than US surrogate’, The Australian Financial Review, 21 November 2012. 
223.  Kishore Mahbubani, ‘Australia’s destiny in the Asian Century: pain or no pain?’, paper prepared for the ‘Emerging 
Asia and the future of the Australia-US alliance’ stream of the US Australia 21st Century Alliance project, 31 July 2012, 
p. 18, accessed 12 July 2013. 
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independent neighbouring country, able to initiate its own individually-derived foreign policy 
approaches. 
Australia’s former Foreign Minister Bob Carr commented in late 2012 on possible membership of 
ASEAN and indicated that this was not on the current agenda for Australia. In an interview on 25 
November 2012 Senator Carr was asked whether he endorsed Mr Keating’s suggestion that Australia 
should seek to join ASEAN and he said: ‘Its fair enough as a vision’, but added: 
Its fair enough to be out there floating as an incentive but in the meantime the practical work is 
to be done on trade relations involving Australia, New Zealand and others with ASEAN and on 
the coordination of foreign policy … if I said today or the Prime Minister said we want to be in 
ASEAN the chances are we would be rebuffed and ASEAN would say “that doesn’t fit our vision”. 
The point is to work at it and work on trade, on foreign policy alignment, on consultation, so that 
when it happens it’s an organic thing, a natural thing …224 
While the discussion in 2012 of the concept of Australian membership in ASEAN was interesting, it is 
clearly in the realm of long-term speculation. A move to try to advance the concept of membership, 
it may be argued, might exacerbate perceptions of differing styles and interests rather than helping 
to consolidate relations and cooperation. Since there are a number of policy areas and institutional 
means through which closer Australian interests with ASEAN can be and are being pursued (as the 
discussion above has noted) it may be suggested that an ongoing process of cooperation and closer 
coordination continues to be the best path for Australia and its ASEAN partners to pursue.  
Concluding comment 
ASEAN has established a high profile in cooperation in East Asia. It has made a major contribution 
towards stabilising relations among its own members and is pursuing ambitious cooperation projects 
to deepen inter-relationships in an ASEAN Community. It has also sponsored a number of wider 
cooperative dialogues which have drawn in many external states, including all the major powers 
with interests in Southeast and East Asia. While these institutions have often found it difficult to 
expand their activities beyond the stage of confidence-building through comparatively non-
controversial projects, East Asia is likely to have had far fewer opportunities for dialogue without 
ASEAN’s role and efforts.  
ASEAN’s progress and prospects are likely to depend on several major factors. In its own cooperation 
among its ten members, ASEAN is pursuing ambitious programs to achieve greater economic, 
political-security and socio-cultural cooperation. While its members continue to be highly sensitive 
about the issues of national sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, in practice, joint 
activities in areas including economic integration and discussions about human rights standards are 
bringing about an increasing awareness of the need for debate and cooperation across national 
boundaries. However, ASEAN’s members are very diverse and achieving deeper economic 
224.  Bob Carr (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Transcript of interview with Peter van Onselen and Paul Kelly, Sky News, 
Australian Agenda, 25 November 2012, transcript, accessed 30 July 2013.  
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integration and an enhanced political and security environment pose major ongoing challenges for 
the Association and its members. ASEAN also has comparatively limited institutional resources to 
support its cooperative programs and may need to make further efforts to expand the financing 
available, particularly for the Secretariat. 
ASEAN’s capacity for cooperation will continue to be affected by political and economic 
developments within its member countries. This is particularly the case in relation to Myanmar. The 
progress in political change and economic reform since the 2010 elections has been a major 
development both internationally and in the ASEAN region. Myanmar’s international image has 
improved and its foreign relations have widened greatly and this is facilitating its capacity to take up 
the role of Chair of the Association in 2014. This will be a high-profile position for Myanmar and 
ASEAN thus has a substantial stake in the continued capacity of the Myanmar Government to 
continue reforms while trying to contain ongoing problems, particularly through alleviating inter-
ethnic disputes and conflict. 
In the wider region of East Asia, ASEAN’s capacity to serve as a sponsor of wider cooperation will 
continue to be affected profoundly by the tenor of relations among the major powers, including key 
bilateral relationships. Rising tensions in major relationships, including particularly those between 
the US and China and China and Japan, would make it much harder for ASEAN to be able to continue 
its desired role as a catalyst for confidence and trust-building within groupings such as the ASEAN 
Regional Forum, ASEAN Plus Three and the East Asia Summit. Major power tensions can also impact 
on ASEAN’s capacity to maintain a climate of cooperation and cohesion among its own members. 
The salience of these issues has been illustrated sharply by the contest for influence in relation to 
the South China Sea. Pressures over competing and intersecting claims for sovereignty have 
increased since 2009. These pressures affect ASEAN members in different ways with some members 
much more directly involved than others. Much will depend on whether ASEAN can manage to make 
progress in seeking to sponsor avenues towards alleviation of tensions and conflict in relation to the 
South China Sea, including through efforts to develop a code of conduct. Without further dialogue 
and coordination, tensions and incidences of dispute could easily increase. 
These issues are all significant for Australia. Since the 1970s Australia has gained great benefits from 
ASEAN’s contribution to stability in the region. Australia’s engagement with the major powers in East 
Asia has been facilitated by ASEAN’s annual dialogue process and its associated groups including the 
ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit. Economic growth has broadened the basis for 
Australia’s engagement with the ASEAN region. ASEAN’s programs for deeper integration can add to 
the basis for Australia’s regional political and economic involvements and Australia therefore has a 
major stake in ASEAN’s ongoing capacity to achieve its declared goals. 
Postscript, 16 October 2013: the ASEAN and East Asia Summits, 
Brunei, October 2013 
After the preceding text was completed (on 1 October 2013), ASEAN held its 23rd Summit (9 October) 
and convened the 8th East Asia Summit (10 October) in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei. 
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The meetings provided ASEAN with a further opportunity to review its own progress and to engage 
with external dialogue partners.  The latter process was clouded to a degree by the absence of 
President Obama, who was forced to cancel his planned visit to Southeast Asia in the face of 
disputes between his Administration and the US Congress over budget and debt-limit approval 
issues. The President had been scheduled to attend the APEC meeting in Bali and the East Asia 
Summit in Brunei and to make bilateral visits to Malaysia and the Philippines.  The cancellation of 
the visit was seen widely as an interruption for the US in its process of continuing engagement with 
Southeast and East Asia.225 
ASEAN’s 23rd heads of government Summit reviewed the Association’s cooperation programs.226 
ASEAN leaders reaffirmed their commitment to pursue the three ASEAN Communities towards the 
target date of the end of 2015.  In the economic sphere, the leaders said that they were encouraged 
by the fact that 79.7 per cent of the measures in the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint had now 
been achieved and they agreed to intensify efforts to ‘… ensure credible integration results by 2015’.  
In political and security cooperation, the leaders reaffirmed a number of ongoing projects including 
the development of the ASEAN Regional Mine Action Centre.  ASEAN leaders also commended the 
ASEAN Defence Ministers Plus grouping for their successful conduct of the Humanitarian Assistance 
and Disaster Relief and Military Medicine exercise in Brunei in June 2013.227  In the socio-cultural 
sphere, ASEAN leaders endorsed a new system to deal with the regional ‘haze’ produced by forest 
burning. The system will involve the sharing of digitised land-use and concession maps of fire-prone 
areas producing incidents of haze.  The data will be shared among the governments of Brunei, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.  It is hoped that these measures will help authorities 
pinpoint where fires are burning and facilitate action to counter the environmental problems arising.  
The leaders also agreed to pursue work on a vision for the Association beyond the year 2015, with a 
report to be presented to a future ASEAN Summit.228 
On the South China Sea, the ASEAN leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the full implementation 
of the 2002 Declaration on Conduct.  They welcomed the commencement of formal consultations 
between ASEAN and China on a Code of Conduct following recent discussions, including the meeting 
in Suzhou, China in September 2013 (noted above).  The leaders stated that the Code of Conduct ‘… 
will serve to enhance peace, stability and prosperity in the region’ and they looked forward to the 
potential to develop communication ‘hotlines’ to facilitate trust and confidence, and to improve 
225.  The possible significance of President Obama’s cancelled visit was under debate at the time of writing. See Rowan 
Callick, ‘Asian “pivot” losing its edge’, The Australian, 8 October 2013, accessed 16 October 2013, and see also Alan 
Dupont, ‘Pivot to Asia has not fallen off its axis’, The Australian, 15 October 2013, accessed 16 October 2013.    
226.  Chairman’s Statement of the 23rd ASEAN Summit, ‘Our people, our future together’, 9 October 2013, Bandar Seri 
Begawan, accessed 16 October 2013.  
227.  Ibid. 
228.  Ibid.; Luke Hunt, ‘Brunei caps off a solid year at ASEAN’s helm’, The Diplomat, 12 October 2013, accessed 16 October 
2013.  
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cooperation in emergency situations at sea and in situations requiring search and rescue for vessels 
in distress.229 
ASEAN also hosted the eighth East Asia Summit (EAS), on 10 October.  Sixteen heads of government 
took part, along with Secretary of State John Kerry (representing the US) and Foreign Minister 
Sergey Lavrov (representing Russia). The Summit took place as a meeting behind closed doors, to 
facilitate free and open discussion. Security issues are understood to have played a central role in 
the talks and a number of participants raised issues related to the South China Sea. Secretary Kerry is 
understood to have called for the conclusion of a Code of Conduct as soon as possible, to facilitate 
peaceful resolution of disputes.  Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan encouraged ASEAN nations to 
present a united front in their discussions with China. China’s Premier Li Keqiang repeated China’s 
position that negotiations on the South China Sea should only be held between directly-concerned 
parties and that any disputes in relation to the area should not impede ASEAN-China economic 
relations.230 The official Chairman’s Statement for the EAS welcomed recent discussions on maritime 
security and cooperation issues, including the September 2013 discussions between ASEAN and 
China and ‘… called on the parties to explore all mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes, 
without resorting to threats or the use of force, and in accordance with universally recognised 
principles of international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), in the region’.231 
The Chairman’s Statement affirmed and reviewed major areas of ongoing cooperation in the fields 
of energy, environment, disaster management, education, global health, finance, trade and 
economic cooperation, and food security. The Statement noted Australia’s ongoing contributions to 
the EAS and to regional cooperation at several points, including cooperation coordinated by 
Australia and Indonesia on rapid responses to disaster management, by Australia and South Korea 
on vocational education, and by Australia and Vietnam in pursuing the Asia-Pacific Leaders’ Malaria 
Alliance.  The Statement also welcomed the initiative (announced by the Abbott Government) to 
pursue the New Colombo Plan to enhance knowledge of the Asia-Pacific in Australia through 
strengthened people-to-people and institutional relationships, and support for study and internships 
for Australian students in the region.232 
The ASEAN meetings in October 2013 were seen overall to have benefited from the skilful 
chairmanship of the host nation, Brunei. At the conclusion of the meetings, the role of Chair of 
229.  ‘Chairman’s Statement of the 23rd ASEAN Summit’, op cit. For a valuable concise assessment of developments 
between ASEAN and China on South China Sea issues between July 2012 and September 2013 see Carlyle A. Thayer, 
‘New commitment to a code of conduct in the South China Sea?’, National Bureau of Asian Research, Washington DC, 
9 October 2013, accessed 16 October 2013.  
230.  Murray Hiebert, Noelan Arbis and Kyle Springer, ‘Critical questions: the 2013 APEC leaders’ meeting and East Asia 
Summit’, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 11 October 2013, accessed 16 October 2013.  
231.  Chairman’s Statement of the 8th East Asia Summit, 10 October 2013, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, 
accessed 16 October 2013.  
232.  Ibid.; Julie Bishop (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Indonesia to participate in New Colombo Plan pilot, media release, 
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ASEAN for the year 2014 was handed over formally to Myanmar, which will host meetings including 
two scheduled ASEAN Summits and the next East Asia Summit.233 
Prime Minister Tony Abbott visited Brunei to take part in the EAS: he had earlier participated in the 
APEC meeting in Bali.  In addition to participating in the Summit, Mr Abbott was also able to hold a 
number of bilateral meetings, including with the leaders of Japan, South Korea, China, India and 
Vietnam.  In a press conference in Brunei on 10 October, Mr Abbott stated that he had found both 
the APEC meeting and the EAS to be very encouraging.  He said that ‘… here in Brunei it’s obvious 
that there are encouraging signs of a development of a code of conduct for relationships in the 
South China Sea. We know that there are some longstanding disputes in the South China Sea. 
Australia's position is that these should be resolved peacefully in accordance with international law, 
and in the meantime, this code of conduct for the parties to these disputes is very important’.234 
Mr Abbott was asked, ‘ … in your view, after your discussions with the various leaders here, what is 
the level of risk, as you see it, of the potential of conflict in the South China Sea and what would you 
see for Australia in the context, [of] the strategic partnership with the various countries involved?’  
In response, Mr Abbott stated: 
There is some risk – no doubt about that – but I think it is a risk that is reducing because of the 
kind of work that is happening at a conference such as this. I do want to make it clear that 
strategic stability in this region – in particular, strategic stability in the South China Sea and in the 
China Sea – is very, very important. It's very, very important. It's important for the whole world, 
not just for the countries which border on the South China Sea. It’s important for Australia. 
Almost 60 per cent of our trade goes through the South China Sea, so strategic stability is very 
important, and I think everyone realises that. I don't think there is a country represented at this 
conference that isn't very conscious of the need for continued strategic stability in the South 
China Sea, and that's why I'm very encouraged by the move towards the establishment of a code 
of conduct.235 
Mr Abbott was also asked about whether he considered it appropriate that the next EAS would be 
held in Myanmar, ‘ … given the ongoing human rights struggles there’.  Mr Abbott stated: 
On Myanmar, or Burma, look, I accept that there have been some human rights issues in that 
country. I think the human rights situation in Burma is much better now than it has been. Aung 
San Suu Kyi is now a part of the process in a way that she wasn’t for many, many years. We had a 
visit from the President of Myanmar to Australia in the last 12 months or so. I'm confident that 
things are moving strongly in the right direction inside Myanmar, or Burma, and I think it's 
perfectly appropriate for this meeting to be there next year.236 
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